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vRE´SUME´
Les processeurs multicoeurs, les syste`mes distribue´s et la virtualisation deviennent de
plus en plus re´pandus, rendant ainsi le de´bogage des syste`mes en production plus diffi-
cile, surtout quand les proble`mes rencontre´s ne sont pas facilement reproductibles. Cette
complexite´ architecturale a introduit une nouvelle gamme de proble`mes potentiels qu’on
devrait pouvoir de´tecter a` l’aide de nouvelles me´thodologies efficaces et extensibles.
En effet, en trac¸ant le noyau d’un syste`me d’exploitation, on est capable d’identifier
les goulots d’e´tranglement, les failles de se´curite´, les bogues de programmation ainsi
que d’autres genres de comportements inde´sirables. Le trac¸age consiste a` collecter les
e´ve´nements pertinents se produisant sur un syste`me en production, tout en ayant un
impact minimal sur la performance ainsi que sur le flot normal d’exe´cution. La trace
ge´ne´re´e est typiquement inspecte´e en diffe´re´, n’introduisant aucun impact sur le syste`me
trace´.
Ce travail pre´sente une nouvelle approche base´e sur les automates pour la mode´lisation
de patrons de comportements proble´matiques sous forme d’une ou plusieurs machines a`
e´tats finis exe´cutables. Ces patrons sont ensuite introduits dans un analyseur qui ve´rifie
leur existence simultane´ment et efficacement dans des traces de plusieurs giga-octets.
L’analyseur fournit une interface de programmation offrant des services essentiels aux
automates.
Les patrons imple´mente´s touchent a` diffe´rents domaines incluant la se´curite´, le test de
logiciels et l’analyse de performance. Les re´sultats de l’analyse fournissent suffisamment
d’information pour identifier pre´cise´ment la source du proble`me ce qui nous a permis
d’identifier une se´quence de code dans le noyau Linux pouvant ge´ne´rer un inter-blocage.
La performance de l’analyseur est line´aire par rapport a` la taille de la trace. Les autres
facteurs affectant sa performance sont discute´s. En outre, la comparaison entre la perfor-
mance de l’analyseur par rapport a` celle d’une approche de´die´e, sugge`re que le surcouˆt
de l’utilisation des machines a` e´tats pour l’exe´cution et non seulement pour la mode´lisa-
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tion, est acceptable surtout lors d’une analyse diffe´re´e.
La solution imple´mente´e est facilement paralle´lisable et pourrait bien s’appliquer a` des
analyses en-ligne. Le me´moire se conclut par une liste de suggestions d’optimisations
possibles pouvant encore ame´liorer la performance de l’analyseur.
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ABSTRACT
As multi-core processors, distributed systems and virtualization are gaining a larger
share in the market, debugging production systems has become a more challenging task,
especially when the occurring problems are not easily reproducible. The new architec-
tural complexity introduced a large number of potential problems that need to be detec-
ted on live systems with adequate, efficient and scalable methodologies. By tracing the
kernel of an operating system, performance bottlnecks, malicious activities, program-
ming bugs and other kinds of problematic behavior could be accurately detected. Tra-
cing consists in monitoring and logging relevant events occurring on live systems with a
minimal performance impact and interference with the flow of execution. The generated
trace is typically inspected remotely with no overhead on the system whatsoever.
This work presents an automata-based approach for modeling patterns of undesired be-
havior using executable Finite State Machines. They are fed into an offline analyzer
which efficiently and simultaneously checks for their occurrences even in traces of se-
veral gigabytes. The analyzer provides an Application Programming Interface offering
essential services to the Finite State Machines. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt
that relies on describing problematic patterns for kernel trace analysis.
The implemented patterns touch on several fields including security, software testing
and performance debugging. The analysis results provide enough information to preci-
sely identify the source of the problem. This was helpful to identify a suspicious code
sequence in the Linux kernel that could generate a deadlock.
The analyzer achieves a linear performance with respect to the trace size. The remaining
factors impacting its performance are also discussed. The performance of the automata-
based approach is compared with that of a dedicated implementation suggesting that
the overhead of using Finite State Machines for execution and not just for modeling is
acceptable especially in post-mortem analysis.
The implemented solution is highly parallelizable and may be ported for online pattern
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matching. The thesis concludes by suggesting a list of possible optimizations that would
further improve the analyzer’s performance.
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CONDENSE´ EN FRANC¸AIS
Les syste`mes informatiques e´voluent tre`s rapidement, et se distinguent par un niveau
de complexite´ supe´rieur a` celui de la ge´ne´ration pre´ce´dente. Parmi ces nouvelles tech-
nologies, la virtualisation, s’exe´cutant possiblement sur des processeurs multi-coeurs,
offre des inte´reˆts de plus en plus visibles, tel que l’utilisation optimale des ressources
et la se´curite´. Cependant, la complexite´ architecturale introduite pre´sente une nouvelle
gamme de proble`mes difficiles a` cibler surtout quand ils apparaissent occasionnelle-
ment sur des machines en production, et ne sont pas facilement reproductibles. En ef-
fet, le premier de´fi consiste a` de´terminer a` quel niveau le proble`me s’est produit : au
niveau d’un processus s’exe´cutant par-dessus la machine virtuelle, ou de la machine
virtuelle elle-meˆme, ou bien au niveau de la machine physique, pour en citer quelques-
uns. E´videmment, les outils de de´bogage traditionnels ne sont pas adapte´s a` l’analyse
du comportement global du syste`me et visent surtout un seul processus en particulier.
Le manque d’outil ade´quat a donne´ naissance au trac¸age du noyau du syste`me d’ex-
ploitation. Le trac¸age consiste a` surveiller et enregistrer les e´ve´nements pertinents se
produisant sur un syste`me en production. Le but principal est de de´terminer pre´cise´ment
ce que le syste`me fait a` chaque instant.
Trac¸age du noyau Pre´sentement, de nombreux efforts visent a` extraire les e´ve´nements
du noyau tout en ayant un impact minimal sur la performance du syste`me (Bligh et al.,
2007), (Cantrill et al., 2004) et (Eckmann et al., 2002). Ces e´ve´nements, typiquement
ge´ne´re´s par l’ordonnanceur, les syste`mes de fichiers, les protocoles re´seau, la communi-
cation inter-processus, les appels syste`mes etc., donnent une vue globale et de´taille´e du
fonctionnement du syste`me. Le trac¸age peut eˆtre constamment active´ pour une longue
pe´riode de temps, ge´ne´rant ainsi plusieurs milliards d’e´ve´nements ; il peut aussi eˆtre
active´ et de´sactive´ par intermittence selon les conditions spe´cifie´es par l’utilisateur. Il
peut eˆtre constamment active´ mais sans sauvegarder les donne´es sur le disque ; les
xe´ve´nements sont e´crits dans des tampons circulaires en me´moire ou` les donne´es les plus
anciennes sont e´crase´es par les plus re´centes. L’e´criture des e´ve´nements sur le disque
ne s’effectue que lorsqu’un proble`me se produit. Cette approche est particulie`rement
utile pour investiguer des proble`mes se produisant accidentellement sur des machines en
production.
Analyse de traces Une fois que la trace est ge´ne´re´e, la prochaine e´tape consiste a`
l’analyser a` l’aide d’outils de base, afin de de´duire la source du proble`me. Les outils les
plus populaires constituent les filtres et les visualisateurs de traces. Les filtres permettent
d’identifier tous les e´ve´nements satisfaisant un certain nombre de contraintes. Les visua-
lisateurs tel que le diagramme de Gantt (LTTng, 2009), permettent au de´veloppeur de
se de´placer a` travers la trace afin de de´terminer visuellement toutes sortes de compor-
tements inattendus. Malgre´ l’utilisation de ces outils, l’analyse reste relativement ma-
nuelle, inefficace et dans certain cas, impossible. En effet, il serait tre`s difficile et inef-
ficace de de´tecter visuellement une mauvaise utilisation des verrous ou bien des signes
d’attaques de de´ni de service. Notre travail consiste donc a` automatiser cette e´tape pour
aboutir a` une analyse de trace plus pre´cise et efficace. La trace est typiquement inspecte´e
en diffe´re´, n’introduisant ainsi aucun impact sur le syste`me trace´.
Objectifs et me´thodologie Notre objectif consiste a` de´tecter automatiquement la pre´sence
d’anomalies dans des traces d’exe´cution ce qui pre´sente les trois de´fis suivants :
1. Fournir un moyen simple, flexible et non-ambigu pour repre´senter des comporte-
ments proble´matique.
2. Recueillir efficacement du noyau les e´ve´nements pertinents pour l’analyse.
3. A` partir d’un seul parcours a` travers la trace, valider l’existence des patrons si-
multane´ment et efficacement. Ensuite, a` la fin de l’analyse, fournir suffisamment
d’information ciblant la source du proble`me.
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Pour ce faire, nous avons commence´ par collecter un ensemble de sce´narios proble´ma-
tique touchant a` diffe´rents domaines tels que la se´curite´, l’analyse de performance et
le test de logiciels. Ceci nous a permis de de´finir les crite`res de se´lection qu’un lan-
gage de description de patrons devrait satisfaire. Ensuite, nous avons e´tudie´ les prin-
cipaux langages utilise´s dans divers domaines (tels que la de´tection d’intrusion et le
de´bogage de performance dans les applications re´parties), que nous avons regroupe´s
en trois cate´gories : les langages spe´cifiques au domaine, les langages ge´ne´riques et
les langages a` base d’automates. En se basant sur les crite`res de se´lection e´tablis, nous
avons justifie´ notre choix du langage de description de patrons. L’analyseur ainsi que les
diffe´rents patrons collecte´s ont e´te´ alors imple´mente´s, tout en ajustant selon les besoins,
l’interface de programmation offerte par l’analyseur.
Crite`res de se´lection Les crite`res de se´lection sur lesquels nous nous sommes base´s
pour choisir le langage de description de patrons le plus convenable se re´sument comme
suit :
– Simplicite´ et Expressivite´ : Le langage devrait fournir un ensemble minimal d’ope´ra-
teurs suffisant pour de´crire les divers patrons de´ja` collecte´s. En meˆme temps, il devrait
eˆtre assez expressif pour exprimer des patrons non conside´re´s.
– Aucune ambiguı¨te´ : La syntaxe du langage devrait eˆtre rigoureusement de´finie, ne
permettant qu’une seule interpre´tation de la description.
– Inde´pendance du traceur : Le langage ne devrait pas de´pendre du format interne de
la trace. En effet, nous voudrions e´viter d’utiliser un langage spe´cifique au domaine
pour plusieurs raisons : premie`rement, pour e´viter le couˆt de maintenance d’un tel lan-
gage. Ensuite, les langages spe´cifiques au domaine sont ge´ne´ralement plus difficiles a`
de´boguer. Finalement, si le format de la trace varie, c’est uniquement l’analyseur qui
devrait le supporter, ainsi tous les patrons de´ja` de´finis resteront intacts.
– Support de patrons a` plusieurs e´ve´nements : certains langages fournissent unique-
ment des ope´rateurs touchant a` un seul e´ve´nement a` la fois. Ceci est a` e´viter car
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les comportements proble´matiques conside´re´s de´pendent tre`s souvent d’une se´quence
d’e´ve´nements bien de´finie.
– Distinction entre une analyse en ligne et hors-ligne : la description des patrons ne doit
pas de´pendre du mode en ligne ou hors-ligne de l’analyse.
Taxonomie des langages Les langages spe´cifiques au domaine constituent le pre-
mier groupe que nous subdivisons en deux cate´gories comprenant les langages des-
criptifs et impe´ratifs. Dans la premie`re cate´gorie, on e´tudie le langage utilise´ par Snort
(SNORT, 2009), un syste`me de de´tection d’intrusion tre`s populaire a` base de re`gles.
Dans la deuxie`me cate´gorie, on e´tudie les langages de DTrace (Cantrill et al., 2004) et
de SytemTap (Eigler, 2006) qui sont deux traceurs de noyau, permettant avec leurs lan-
gages, d’effectuer une analyse en ligne. On e´tudie aussi RUSSEL (Habra et al., ), un
langage de description de re`gles de se´curite´.
Le deuxie`me groupe comprend les langages ge´ne´riques. On identifie dans ce groupe
EXPERT (Wolf et al., 2004), un syste`me de de´tection de proble`mes de performance
dans des traces OpenMP et MPI. EXPERT emploie le language ge´ne´rique Python pour
de´crire les proprie´te´s de performance.
Dans le troisie`me groupe, on de´crit et compare les principaux langages a` base d’au-
tomates. Les langages de ce groupe offrent un haut niveau d’abstraction permettant
de de´finir des e´ve´nements synthe´tiques a` partir de plusieurs e´ve´nements primitifs. On
identifie dans cette cate´gorie Ragel (RAGEL, 2009), un langage souvant utilise´ dans
les analyses syntaxiques. De meˆme, on e´tudie STATL (Eckmann et al., 2002), un lan-
gage qui permet de de´crire des sce´narios d’attaque sous forme de machines a` e´tats finis.
Finalement, on e´tudie le compilateur SMC (Compiler, 2009), un projet accessible et
open-source. Ce dernier fournit un langage offrant des fonctionnalite´s et caracte´ristiques
le rendant tre`s extensible. En effet, le compilateur convertit le langage en 14 langages
ge´ne´riques supporte´s, et donc le code ge´ne´re´ est capable de profiter d’une interface de
programmation fournie par un autre langage. Pour ces raisons, nous avons utilise´ SMC
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pour de´crire les patrons capables de s’interfacer avec notre analyseur.
L’utilisation d’un langage a` base d’automates pour la description de patrons consiste a`
mode´liser le comportement proble´matique sous forme d’une machine a` e´tats. La pre´sence
d’un e´ve´nement particulier dans la trace va de´clencher une transition d’un e´tat vers un
autre, si la garde de transition est e´value´e a` Vrai. A` ce moment-la`, les actions de´finies
pour cette transition sont exe´cute´es. Les actions servent typiquement a` mettre a` jour les
structures de donne´es locales ou globales, a` s’interfacer avec l’analyseur ou a` ge´ne´rer
des alertes.
Ensemble de patrons conside´re´s Avant d’e´tablir les crite`res de se´lection d’un lan-
gage convenable, il e´tait indispensable d’avoir une liste de patrons proble´matiques et
repre´sentatifs, touchant a` diffe´rents domaines et qu’on regroupe en trois cate´gories :
Patrons de se´curite´
1. L’attaque SYN flood : Le SYN flood est une attaque de de´ni de service qui
consiste a` inonder un serveur avec un grand nombre de connexions TCP semi-
ouvertes. Les indices d’une telle attaque sont visibles dans une trace du noyau
si les e´ve´nements pertinents sont instrumente´s. Il est tre`s inefficace de de´tecter
manuellement ce genre de patrons, d’ou` l’inte´reˆt de notre approche.
2. Prison chroot : S’e´chapper d’une prison chroot est un autre type d’attaque qu’on
peut de´tecter. L’appel syste`me chroot() est parfois utilise´ quand un processus pri-
vile´gie´ veut restreindre l’acce`s a` un sous-arbre du syste`me de fichier. Si ce proces-
sus essaie d’ouvrir un fichier avant d’appeler chdir(”/”), alors une faille de se´curite´
se pre´sente. En effet, l’attaquant peut toujours sortir d’une prison chroot en tru-
quant le programme pour ouvrir le fichier ../../../../etc/shadow par exemple. Res-
treindre l’acce`s a` un sous-arbre n’est pas accompli par un appel unique a` chroot. La
bonne fac¸on de proce´der serait d’appeler chdir(”/”) imme´diatement apre`s l’appel
syste`me chroot().
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3. Les virus Linux : Malgre´ qu’ils soient difficiles a` trouver, les virus s’exe´cutant
sous Linux existent et peuvent eˆtre de´tecte´s a` l’aide d’une trace d’exe´cution. L’ap-
proche qu’on propose diffe`re de celles utilise´es dans les logiciels anti-virus. Lors-
qu’un nouveau virus est de´couvert, il suffit de l’exe´cuter sur une machine virtuelle
roulant un noyau Linux instrumente´ afin d’eˆtre capable d’enregistrer toutes ses
interactions avec le syste`me d’exploitation. Ces interactions de´finissent le com-
portement du virus que nous encodons sous forme de patron afin de de´tecter sa
pre´sence a` partir d’une trace d’exe´cution.
Patrons de test de logiciels
1. Utilisation des verrous : Les ressources partage´es ne´cessitent une prise de verrou
avant d’y acce´der pour e´viter les situations de compe´tition. Dans le noyau Linux,
le verrouillage est plus de´licat qu’en mode utilisateur a` cause des diffe´rents e´tats
possibles (pre´emption active´e/de´sactive´e, traitement d’IRQ, etc.). Par exemple, un
verrou tournant pris quand les interruptions sont active´es, ne doit jamais eˆtre pris
dans un gestionnaire d’interruption. La raison est simple : l’interruption peut ar-
river a` n’importe quel moment, particulie`rement lorsque le verrou est de´ja` pris,
inter-bloquant ainsi le processeur correspondant. Il est possible de s’assurer au
moment de l’exe´cution que toute prise de verrou est valide et de signaler celles qui
ne le sont pas. Cependant, cette option requiert la recompilation du noyau et ajoute
un impact en performance continu au syste`me. Par conse´quent, nous encodons un
sous-ensemble des re`gles d’utilisation des verrous sous forme d’une machine a`
e´tats par CPU, et nous proce´dons a` leur validation dans des traces d’exe´cutions.
Ceci nous a permis d’identifier une se´quence de code dans le noyau Linux qui
pourrait ge´ne´rer un inter-blocage.
2. Utilisation des descripteurs de fichiers : Un autre bogue de programmation
de´tectable a` partir d’une trace, consiste a` acce´der a` un descripteur de ficher apre`s
l’avoir ferme´. L’ouverture, l’acce`s et la fermeture d’un descripteur de fichier doivent
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suivre un ordre bien de´fini. Ceci repre´sente une plus grande classe d’erreurs de pro-
grammation ou` deux ou plusieurs e´ve´nements sont logiquement et temporellement
relie´s.
Patrons de de´bogage de performance
1. Inefficacite´s I/O : Certaines inefficacite´s dans les logiciels peuvent eˆtre de´tecte´es
a` partir des e´ve´nements d’entre´e et de sortie I/O. Par exemple, un processus qui ef-
fectue de fre´quentes e´critures de tre`s peu de donne´es au disque pourrait conside´rablement
affecter la performance du syste`me. De meˆme, la lecture des donne´es qui viennent
d’eˆtre e´crites, ou bien deux lectures conse´cutives des meˆmes donne´es, ou l’e´crasement
des donne´es qui viennent d’eˆtre e´crites, sont toutes des signes d’inefficacite´ vi-
sibles dans une trace du noyau.
2. Contraintes temporelles : Les applications multime´dia, et plus ge´ne´ralement les
applications temps-re´el, sont caracte´rise´es par leurs contraintes temporelles. En
supposant que le trac¸age de l’ordonnanceur du noyau a un surcouˆt ne´gligeable, on
ve´rifie que les contraintes temporelles (telles que la pe´riode d’ordonnancement et
la tranche de temps alloue´e) sont satisfaites et si elles ne le sont pas, on montre ce
que le syste`me faisait durant ce temps.
Imple´mentation LTTng (LTTng, 2009), un traceur noyau open-source, a` faible im-
pact, a e´te´ choisi pour instrumenter les e´ve´nements requis pour notre liste de patrons.
Le compilateur SMC a e´te´ utilise´ pour ge´ne´rer du code C a` partir des machines a` e´tats
de´crites par le langage SM (voir section 3.4.2). Pour chaque e´ve´nement pertinent, l’ana-
lyseur enregistre des fonctions de rappel avec le programme de lecture et de visualisation
de trace LTTV. Ce programme lit la trace se´quentiellement en une seule passe. L’analy-
seur maintient une liste de toutes les instances des machines a` e´tats (mode´lisant le meˆme
comportement proble´matique) qu’il invoque se´quentiellement. Lorsqu’un e´ve´nement
pertinent est rencontre´, l’analyseur appelle les transitions correspondantes pour chaque
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machine a` e´tats. Le flot de controˆle est alors transfe´re´ a` la machine a` e´tats qui, a` son tour,
e´value les gardes de la transition et si elles sont e´value´es a` Vrai, les actions spe´cifie´es
sont exe´cute´es. L’e´tat courant de la machine devient alors l’e´tat destination de la tran-
sition et le flot de controˆle revient a` l’analyseur. Ce dernier invoque la machine a` e´tats
suivante et ainsi de suite.
Dans certains cas, lorsqu’une transition est de´clenche´e, une duplication de la machine
a` e´tats est ne´cessaire. Par exemple, si le patron consiste a` de´tecter un acce`s errone´ a` un
descripteur de fichier, une machine a` e´tats existerait pour chaque processus acce´dant a` un
descripteur particulier. L’analyseur offre une interface de programmation API fournis-
sant des services tels que la duplication et la destruction des machines a` e´tats. Certains
patrons, tel que celui qui mode´lise une utilisation errone´e des verrous, requiert une seule
machine a` e´tats par CPU. Dans ces cas, l’analyseur de´termine sur quel CPU l’e´ve´nement
est apparu, et appelle la transition de la machine a` e´tats de ce CPU.
L’approche a` base d’automates offre une grande flexibilite´ pour la mode´lisation, la mise
a` jour et l’optimisation des patrons. En effet, lorsqu’on a instrumente´ les e´ve´nements
pertinents pour le patron qui consiste a` de´tecter les mauvaises utilisations des verrous, il a
e´te´ remarque´ que les e´ve´nements qui de´finissent l’entre´e et la sortie d’une interruption ne
sont pas ne´cessaires vu que cette information peut eˆtre recueillie a` partir du site de prise
du verrou. A` ce point-la`, un e´tat et deux transitions de l’automate ont pu eˆtre e´limine´s.
Performance En exe´cutant l’analyseur pour valider des traces de diffe´rentes tailles, il
a e´te´ constate´ que le temps d’exe´cution de l’analyseur est line´aire par rapport a` la taille
de la trace. Cependant, trois autres facteurs affectent la performance de l’analyseur : le
nombre de machines a` e´tats coexistantes durant l’analyse (section 3.6), leur complexite´
(consommation en me´moire et temps de calcul) et la fre´quence d’e´ve´nements pertinents
dans la trace.
La performance de l’analyseur a aussi e´te´ compare´e a` celle d’une version de´die´e. Cette
dernie`re est imple´mente´e en C et effectue les meˆmes validations que celles de´finies
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dans l’automate qui valide l’utilisation des verrous (voir section 3.4.3). La performance
de l’analyseur est uniquement 4.5% plus lente que la version de´die´e, sugge´rant que le
surcouˆt d’utilisation des automates pour l’exe´cution, et non juste pour la mode´lisation,
est acceptable surtout lors d’une analyse en diffe´re´.
La taille de la trace a e´te´ fixe´e alors que le nombre de clients dbench (un benchmark
qui ge´ne`re un grand nombre d’e´ve´nements d’entre´e et de sortie) exe´cute´s sur la machine
trace´e varie. Pour le patron qui valide les utilisations des descripteurs de fichiers, le
nombre de machines a` e´tats coexistantes augmente proportionnellement avec le nombre
de clients dbench. On e´tudie alors le surcouˆt cause´ par le fait d’invoquer les machines a`
e´tats. Le ralentissement est proportionnel au nombre de machines traite´es simultane´ment
par l’analyseur. Ceci est attendu car, pour chaque e´ve´nement pertinent, l’analyseur in-
voque successivement toutes les machines a` e´tats coexistantes, meˆme si l’e´ve´nement est
non pertinent dans l’e´tat courant de l’automate. Si l’e´ve´nement cause un de´clenchement
d’une transition dans une machine a` e´tats, on dit alors que l’e´ve´nement a e´te´ consomme´
par cette dernie`re. Dans plusieurs cas, un e´ve´nement ne peut eˆtre consomme´ que par une
seule machine a` e´tats. Pour cela, on a introduit une fonction API qui force l’analyseur a`
sortir de sa boucle principale qui ite`re sur tous les automates, pour passer a` l’e´ve´nement
suivant ; une ame´lioration non ne´gligeable en termes de performance a e´te´ obtenue.
Travaux Futurs En premie`re priorite´, nous voudrions supporter les e´ve´nements syn-
the´tiques. En exprimant un e´ve´nement synthe´tique a` partir de plusieurs e´ve´nements pri-
mitifs, il serait possible de de´crire des patrons plus complexes efficacement et d’une
fac¸on modulaire. Le temps de calcul par e´ve´nement pertinent atteint 20 microsecondes
pour un nombre total de machines a` e´tats coexistantes e´gal a` 516. Par conse´quent, si
la fre´quence d’e´ve´nements pertinents, se produisant sur un syste`me en production, est
infe´rieure a` 50kHz, les CPUs non-exploite´s comple`tement pourraient tre`s bien eˆtre uti-
lise´s pour effectuer la validation des patrons en ligne. La solution propose´e est facilement
paralle´lisable et il serait inte´ressant d’e´tudier le gain en performance re´sultant, dans le
xviii
but d’effectuer l’analyse en ligne.
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1INTRODUCTION
Context The development and operation of embedded systems, multi-core proces-
sors, multi-threaded and distributed applications with real-time constraints present new
challenges that need to be overcome with adequate, efficient and scalable methodologies.
The biggest challenge is to understand what the system is doing at any given time, with
a minimal interference, in order to avoid an impact on the performance or the system
behavior. To achieve this goal, the kernel of an operating system needs to be efficiently
instrumented either statically in the source code or dynamically at runtime, enabling ex-
perts to diagnose a large set of problems touching on several fields such as performance
debugging and security.
Currently, many efforts are targetting data aggregation from the kernel and user-space at
the lowest possible cost. This field is known as kernel and user-space tracing. Systems
exhibiting an undesirable behavior are put under monitoring to generate a trace of rel-
evant information, containing the sequence of events that happened on the system just
before the time when the problem occurred.
Eventhough it is a relatively new field, open source kernel tracing has rapidly gained
a wide popularity among kernel and driver developers. It became an essential tool to
exactly understand what the system is doing at any given time and at a high level of
granularity. However, analyzing the trace would require system experts to manually
identify any suspicious sequence of events that is causing the undesired behavior, and
this process is generally very time consuming. Instead, it would be beneficial to encode a
list of problematic patterns and look for them efficiently in a trace maximizing therefore
the chances of finding problems in a trace.
Tracing could be constantly active for a long period of time, generating billions of events;
2it could be activated and disactivated intermittently on specific user-defined conditions.
It could also be constantly activated but without writing the data to disk; there, the events
are kept in cyclic memory buffers where the oldest data is overwritten by the newest.
When the problematic condition occurs, the buffers are dumped to disk for analysis.
This approach is analogous to the data flight-recorder found in airplanes and is very
useful for accident investigation whenever the problem is hard to reproducible.
When tracing is completed, the next step requires experts to look at the data using basic
tools and infer the main cause of the problem. Depending on the nature of the prob-
lem, this step may be very time-consuming and inefficient; and in some cases almost
impossible.
Our work aims at automating the trace examination process whenever useful, enabling
a precise, more efficient and faster data analysis. Problems we try to diagnose relate to
different fields and we aim at looking for all problem types simultaneously in one or
several large per-cpu traces.
Objectives Trace files of several gigabytes are generated at run-time. We would like
to inspect the presence of anomalies in traces automatically. The lack of adequate tools
for this purpose motivated us to develop a pattern detection trace analyzer which leaves
us in front of three challenges:
1. Provide a simple, flexible and unambiguous way to represent patterns of problem-
atic behavior.
2. Collect relevant events efficiently from production systems with a minimal perfor-
mance impact.
3. Scan traces in one pass to validate them simultaneously against numerous patterns
efficiently.
3The project should enable us to encode undesirable properties into patterns which can
later be used to automatically validate traces generated from production systems. Once a
pattern is found, enough information should be supplied so that measures could be taken
to eliminate the occurring problem.
Scientific Methodology The steps we took to reach this goal are summarized as fol-
lows:
1. Typical patterns: the work started by collecting a set of problematic patterns that
would be typically looked for in a kernel trace, by performance and security engi-
neers. This step is essential since we would like to provide a generic framework,
supporting new pattern descriptions touching on different fields. This has greatly
helped us understand the problem requirements and therefore determine the appro-
priate mechanism to express and validate multiple hybrid patterns. These patterns
are described in Chapter 4.
2. Analogy with other systems: Eventhough pattern matching is new in the ker-
nel field, it is not the case in the intrusion detection nor in the parallel computing
fields. Many scenario-based intrusion detection systems provide a mechanism to
describe security threats or rules, which are then used for validation when analyz-
ing network traffic, whether live or offline. The logged network packets waiting
to be processed could consume several gigabytes in storage, and therefore provide
the same challenges as in large kernel trace. When a rule triggers a security vio-
lation, the security engineers are alerted, and measures are taken to deal with the
problem. Similarly, in the parallel computing field, there is a wide interest in auto-
matic performance debugging. Parallel programs may exhibit inefficient behavior
especially when the message passing between different processes running on dif-
ferent CPUs don’t occur in the right order. It was important to study the different
4systems because of the tight similarity of their objective with ours. We didn’t find
a unique and common pattern description language used among the different sys-
tems we studied. However, we came up with a criteria list for a pattern description
language based on the typical patterns we collected in the previous step. The main
features as well as limitations of the different studied languages are summarized
in Chapter 1. We divided the studied languages into 3 seperate categories: the Do-
main Specific Languages which are further divided into imperative and declarative
DSLs, the General Purpose Languages and the Automata-Based Languages.
3. Automata-Based Approach: Based on the study we lead on the different pat-
tern description languages which was summarized in Chapter 1, as well as the
criteria list described in the previous step (details in Chapter 1), an automata-
based approach for pattern description seemed the most convenient. We studied
and compared some of the most important automata-based lanugages including
STATL (Eckmann et al., 2002), RAGEL (RAGEL, 2009) and SMC (Compiler,
2009). We show how the automata-based approach is applicable by actually using
it to implement the collected patterns.
4. Implementation: The implementation is divided into two parts. The patterns im-
plementation using the automata-based approach and the analyzer’s implementa-
tion. The different patterns described in Chapter 4 are implemented as well as the
analyzer which checks for their existence in large traces. Since the analyzer needs
to be very efficient, and capable of processing multiple traces while validating a
set of patterns simultaneously, we studied a set of popular trace analyzers in Chap-
ter 2. Our main interest was basically to study their overall system artchitecture as
well as the optimization approaches, if any, they adopt.
5. Testing: Once the implementation phase is done, we proceed by testing the per-
formance of the analyzer. The main goal is to study the scalability of the appoach
and whether it may be possible to define a large pool of patterns for automatic
5validation in reasonable amounts of time.
Thesis Organization The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, the different
pattern description languages used in the Intrusion Detection and Parallel Computing
fields, are studied. Furthermore, their main features and limitations are summarized
after dividing them into 3 seperate categories. We also argument on the reasons behind
adopting an automata-based language instead of an imperative or declarative DSL. Then,
in Chapter 2, we study some of the popular trace analysis tools, where our main interest
is to identify their optimization techniques as well as their overall system architecture.
The core of our work is thouroughly described in Chapter 3. It is a journal article sub-
mitted to the Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications in which
a quick litterature review is provided, followed by the explanation and implementation
of our approach. Four patterns are implemented using a state machine language and
fed to the analyzer for a successive testing phase. Results are presented, highlighting
the performance of the analyzer as well as a potential problem it was able to detect. In
Chapter 4 we provide some complemantary results that were not included in the Chapter
3 article. In Chapter 5 we provide a general discussion of our work touching on both the
scalability and performance of the analyzer. The last Chapter concludes our work.
6CHAPTER 1
PATTERN DESCRIPTION LANGUAGES
Analyzing kernel traces for pattern matching requires a non-ambiguous, easy to use
pattern description language. It should be possible to express using this language a wide
variety of patterns touching on several fields of interest such as security, performance
debugging and software testing. We first define the language selection criteria based on
the nature of patterns we would be typically looking for in a kernel trace. Then we study
a wide variety of languages used in various fields for detecting problematic behavior in
traces.
In intrusion detection, languages are used to describe security rules and attack scenarios
for validation in audit trails (some of those languages are also used for lexical and syn-
tactic analysis). Furthermore, in parallel computing, other languages are used to express
performance-based properties to be be validated in MPI and OpenMP traces. Similarly,
kernel tracers such as DTrace and SystemTap provide languages dedicated to perform
run-time trace analysis.
1.1 Language Criteria
We first started by collecting a large set of typical patterns of problematic behavior to
look for in a kernel trace. We summarize our findings in chapter 3 and based on them
we come up with a criteria list that covers the most important aspects we are looking for
in a pattern description language. They are:
1. Simplicity: The language should only provide a minimal set of operators sufficient
7to describe the variety of patterns.
2. Expressiveness: It should be possible to describe using the language all sorts of
known problematic patterns as well as new ones which may be defined in the
future.
3. Tracer-independent: The language shouldn’t depend on the internal format of the
kernel trace. Whether the kernel events are collected using one tracer or another,
the pattern description should not vary at all.
4. Unambiguous: The language should have a rigorously defined syntax and seman-
tics allowing only one clear interpretation of a described pattern.
5. Multi-event-based patterns support: Some languages, such as the one used to write
Snort rules, provide operators that are useful to process only one event, whereas
in many cases, the patterns are composed of multiple events. It should be possible
to describe such patterns including the ordering between the events.
6. On-line/Off-line distinction: the language should not make any apriori assump-
tions of whether the analysis is performed on-line or off-line.
1.2 Taxonomy of pattern description languages
We divide the languages to be studied into three seperate categories: Domain Specific
Languages, General Purpose Languages and Automata-Based Languages. Domain Spe-
cific Languages are further divided into Declarative Domain Specific Languages and
Imperative Domain Specific Languages. The languages studied in this chapter can be
good candidates for event-based programming and we study how applicable they could
be for us to describe problematic patterns that can be found in a kernel trace.
81.2.1 Domain Specific Languages
Domain specific languages DSLs, previously known as special purpose programming
languages, are usually dedicated to solve a particular problem or implement a well-
defined domain specific task as opposed to general-purpose programming languages
such as C or Java. Examples of domain specific languages include VHDL, a hardware
description language, Csound, a language for creating audio files, and DOT, an input
language for GraphViz, a graph visualization software. We divide DSLs further into two
more categories: Declarative DSLs and Imperative DSLs.
DSL Advantages The need for a new DSL is often justified whenever the introduced
language helps formulating a particular problem or solution more clearly and more eas-
ily than by using preexisting languages. For instance, it should support the level of
abstraction of the specific domain, hiding all the low-level complexity and implementa-
tion, so that the field experts can easily understand, maintain, update and develop new
DSL-based programs.
1.2.1.1 Declarative DSLs
Declarative programming, in contrast with imperative programming, consists in describ-
ing what is to be done rather than how to do it. In other words, the logic of a computation
is described rather than the control flow of the program. A popular intrusion detection
system called Snort employs a declarative DSL to describe a large number of security
related rules which are validated by inspecting the network packets. The language will
be studied in this chapter.
9Declarative DSLs for IDS DSLs are widely used in the intrusion detection field. Snort
and Panoptis are both good examples of intrusion detection systems that use domain
specific languages for threats detection. The introduced DSLs provide a number of ad-
vantages. First, they provide a domain-specific high-level of abstraction facilitating their
use by domain experts. Second, the code is generally self-documenting, reducing the
required time to generate the script documentation as well as the time needed to under-
stand the code. Third, by being declarative, they remove the burden of specifying the
full solution implementation including the control flow of the program. However they
incur an additional cost for the design, implementation and maintenance of the language.
Furthermore, the DSL-based programs can be hard to debug.
Snort Snort (SNORT, 2009) is a free, open source, extensible, intrusion prevention and
detection system that can be used as a packet sniffer, a packet logger or a network-based
intrusion detection system (NIDS). It can operate by validating a database of security
rules against the network packets. Rules are used to capture malicious packets before
they can cause any damage to the system.
Snort Rules Snort employs a declarative DSL for rules descriptions. Packet networks
are inspected by Snort IDS based on the specified rules. As an example, a rule could
state that any packet directed to port 80 and containing the string “cmd.exe” is consid-
ered malicious and therefore measures could be taken to deal with it. Snort rules are a
set of declarative instructions designed to express a pattern to look for in the network
packets. Many parts of the packet could be inspected such as the source and destina-
tion IP addresses, the source and destination port numbers, the protocol options and the
packet payload. Rules are composed of two parts: the rule header and the rule options.
The header contains the rule’s action, protocol, source and destination IP addresses and
netmasks and the source and destination ports numbers. The rule options are used for
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many operations such as content matching, TCP flags testing or payload size checking,
etc. Below is an example illustrating a simple Snort rule:
alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 111 (content:“|000186a5|”; msg:”mountd access”;)
Rule Headers The text outside of the parentheses forms the rule header. The differ-
ent fields that form a rule header are: Rule actions, protocols, IP addresses, and port
numbers. In the first part of the header, we can specify one of the three possible actions:
• Log action: logs the packet that caused the rule to fire.
• Alert action: logs the packet that caused the rule to fire and generates an alert using
the selected alert method.
• Pass action: drops the packet.
The next field in the rule header is the protocol. The three protocols that Snort supports
are TCP, UDP and ICMP. Then, the source and destination IP addresses are specified in
the header. The keyword “any” is used to define any IP address. The Direction oper-
ator “->” is used to differentiate between the source and the destination of the packet.
Furthermore, the netmask could be specified to designate a block of addresses for the
destination. In the last part of the header, port numbers are specified. One or a range of
port numbers can be specified either directly or by negation.
Rule Options Snort provides 15 different rule options that are used for operations such
as pattern matching or testing the IP and TCP fields. For instance, one can test the TCP
flags or the TTL for certain values. All rule options deal with one packet at a time. So
basically, writing a Snort rule would consist in defining a set of constraints on the fields
of every occurring packet. Snort validates the packets one at a time, and doesn’t allow
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one rule to be fired based on constraints touching on two seperate packets. This is mainly
due to the fact that Snort was designed to process packets online while incurring a low
impact on the system’s performance. By expressing more complex rules, the run-time
packet inspection would significantly impact the system’s performance.
Snort for pattern description The language used for Snort rules is a good example
of a declarative DSL. The rule writer doesn’t have to worry about the implementation
details, such as accessing the fields pointers in the packet headers in order to perform
the tests, or opening a file to log the packet. Providing a DSL for kernel trace analysis
such as Snort language, would enable programmers to develop patterns at a high level
of abstraction. However, the major limitation we found in Snort rules is that they don’t
allow us to express relationships between different events. In fact, many problematic
patterns could only exist upon the occurrence of two or more events. For instance,
detecting a potential deadlock by analyzing a kernel trace cannot be achived using a
one-level, Snort-like rule, and therefore we consider other alternatives.
1.2.2 Imperative DSLs
According to the definition found in Wikipedia, imperative programming is a program-
ming paradigm that describes computations in terms of statements that change a pro-
gram state. In fact, imperative languages, in contrast with declarative languages, provide
a mean to specify “how” something should be done rather than simply “what” should
be done. Procedural programming for instance, is considered imperative by its nature,
and is possible when the imperative language supports structuring statements into pro-
cedures. Furthermore, object-oriented programming such as in C++ and Java is also
considered as being an imperative programming at their core but not Domain Specific.
They are general purpose programming languages. Imperative Domain Specific Lan-
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Figure 1.1 Russel Rule: Activates another rule upon detection of a failed login
guage are found in Intrusion Detection Systems such as ASAX. ASAX is an IDS that
uses RUSSEL, a rule-based imperative DSL designed specifically for audit-trail analy-
sis. In addition to RUSSEL, we study in this category SystemTap and Dtrace scripting
languages which are also considered as imperartive DSLs.
1.2.2.1 RUSSEL
The RUle-baSed Sequence Evaluation Language RUSSEL (Habra et al., ), is an impera-
tive, rule-based DSL that is used for audit-trail analysis as a part of the ASAX Intrusion
Detection project. It is specifically designed to allow queries to be processed in one pass
over the trace. Unlike the limitation found in Snort rules, RUSSEL provides a mecha-
nism for one rule to trigger another. This can greatly enhance the flexibility of describing
more complex rules based on simpler ones.
In the example shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, two rules are described. The first one tries
to detect a failed login in the trace. Whenever it does, it activates another rule which
counts the number of subsequent failed logins. When the maximum number of failed
logins is reached (i.e. countdown reaches zero), the rule sends an alert message.
When the condition at line 5 is true, the rule Failed login triggers off the Count failed logins
rule. Then at line 8 the rule triggers itself unconditionally, keeping itself active during
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Figure 1.2 RUSSEL Rule: Counts the number of failed logins
the whole analysis time. This is not the case for Count failed logins rule shown in Figure
1.2 where the self-triggering is skipped whenever the condition timestp >= expiration
is true.
RUSSEL for Pattern Description RUSSEL is a good example of a DSL that is flex-
ible enough and doesn’t have the limitation found in Snort rules. The idea is that one
rule can trigger another and therefore any pattern composed of a succession of events
may be expressed by dedicating one rule per event. While the rule triggering mechanism
is interesting, complex patterns composed of multiple threads of events, which can also
be interconnected, can quickly become very hard to express in the language. Consider
for instance a pattern described using the following set of rules r1, r2, r3. Suppose that
r1 triggers r2 upon the occurrence of a particular event in the trace satisfying a certain
condition. Similarly, r2 triggers r3. Now, if the same pattern can occur simultaneously
for different user-space processes, then it may not be possible to detect the two occur-
rences since even if every active rule has its local variables, it is not possible to have two
active rules of the same type each having its own local variables. Furthermore, the rule
triggering mechanism can be easily ported into a general purpose language by imple-
menting it in a dynamic library for example. This would remove the maintenance cost
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of the language and the resulting code may possibly run faster, and be easier to debug.
1.2.2.2 DTrace D Language
DTrace (Cantrill et al., 2004) is a dynamic and static instrumation framework for both
kernel and user-space tracing. It runs under Solaris 10, Mac OS X 10.5 and FreeBSD.
Recent work aims at porting DTrace for Linux. Dynamic instrumentation consists in
adding instrumentation sites dynamically (i.e. at runtime) in contrast with static instru-
mentation where the source code is modified for the same purpose. DTrace employs a
C-like language called D, that is used to specify probe points (instrumentation sites) in
the kernel and to implement their associated handlers. These handlers could be used to
perform run-time trace analysis such as pattern matching. The D language supports all
of the ANSI C operators and data types as well as the struct, union and enum types.
D variables
Thread-local variables D supports the declaration of thread-local variables, where
every thread gets its own copy of the variable. The per-thread variable can later be used
in any probe handler.
A small example illustrating the declaration and use of a thread-local variable via the
prefix self-> is shown in Figure 1.3. The example was taken from (DTrace., 2009).
At line 1, a probe handler is defined which is to be called at every entry of a read system
call. A probe description has the following form: “provider:module:function:name”.
Inside the handler, the event time stamp is saved in a thread-local variable accessed
using the special operator self->. Every user-space thread issuing a read system-call
will get its own copy of the t variable. At line 5, another handler is defined which is to
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Figure 1.3 DTrace: Compute the time spent per thread in the read system call
Figure 1.4 DTrace: Output obtained upon running Example 1.3
be called just before returning from every read system call. Inside the handler, the time
spent serving the system call is computed and the variable t is reinitialized to 0.
An example of the output is shown in Figure 1.4.
D Clause-Local Variables The D language also supports the declaration of clause-
local variables which are only active during the execution of the probe handler. Their
values remain persistent across handlers enabling the same probe.
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Figure 1.5 DTrace: using the count aggregating function
External Variables Since the D probe handlers are executed at run-time, it is possi-
ble to access types and symbols from the kernel or the kernel modules. For instance,
the Solaris kernel has a global variable called kmem flags. It can be accessed in a D
program by using the backquote character (‘) as a prefix before the variable name (i.e.
‘kmem flags).
Aggregating functions The DTrace aggregating functions provide a mechanism for
performing a set of predefined computations in a probe handler and are mainly used for
data aggregation. As an example, the script shown in Figure 1.5 counts the number of
times the write system call has been entered by storing the results per executable.
D For Pattern Description The D programming language is considered an imperative
C-like language and provides at the same time new mechanisms dedicated for kernel
trace analysis such as probe site definition, support for thread-local variables and a set
of aggregating functions. This is why we placed the D language in the category of the
imperative DSLs. There are many features of the language that are not covered here. We
only cover those features that could be useful for our offline pattern recognition trace
analysis.
The D language’s new features are very well adapted for online analysis. They include
probes activation, accessing kernel variables and aggregating only the relevant data at
run-time to minimize the amount of information to store. However we see two major
limitations in terms of applicability to our problem. First, many features of the D lan-
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guage are only applicable for online analysis such as activating probe points in the kernel
or accessing the live kernel data. Second, the D language does not provide an easy way
to describe complex patterns of problematic behavior. For example, the programmer
would still have to manually encode the pattern in question across the different probe
handlers, using an imperative C-like language.
1.2.2.3 SystemTap
SystemTap is a dynamic tracer for Linux that uses the kprobes infrastructure to dynam-
ically instrument the kernel. It is an open source project with contributors from IBM,
Red Hat, Intel, Hitachi, Oracle and others. Unlike the D script files which are interpreted,
SystemTap scripts are translated into C code, compiled as kernel modules and inserted
into the Linux kernel. As in DTrace, SystemTap scripts are used to activate probe points
in the kernel and to implement their associated handlers. Furthermore, Systemtap scripts
can have global variables, conditional statements, while and for loops. However the Sys-
temTap language lacks types and declarations but adds associative arrays and simplified
string processing.
Extraction functions As in Dtrace’s aggregating functions, SystemTap has the extrac-
tion functions. The aggregation operator (<<<) is used to keep track of the values of
interest. An example using the aggregation operator is shown in Figure 1.6.
At line 2, the probe point is defined. Probe definition has the following syntax:
probe PROBEPOINT [, POBEPOINT ] [STMT...]
The global variable reads declared at line 1, can be seen as an array storing all the values
and their number of occurrence, that are assigned to the array using the aggregation op-
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Figure 1.6 SystemTap: using the aggregation operator
erator (<<<) as shown at line 3. Then, at the end of the analysis, the extractor functions
could be used to perform some operations over the aggregated data. For example, the
avg() extractor function shown at line 6 is used to compute the average of all values ac-
cumulated into reads. Similarly, other functions can compute the minimum, maximum,
sum or count the number of accumulated values. Other statistical functions could be
called to show the distribution of values in text based histograms at the output.
SystemTap has many other features. For instance, it performs safety and security check-
ing in order not to allow the running kernel module in which the probe handlers are
running from performing unsafe operations which may lead to a kernel crash or data
corruption. We are mainly interested in the features that could be applicable in our
work.
Systemtap for Pattern Description SystemTap scripts can enable the programmer
to perform many computations at runtime similarly to DTrace. Both offer specialized
functions to visualize the distribution and statistics of relevant data. We considered the
Systemtap language as being procedural and imperative due to the similarities it has with
the C language. It is also a DSL because it allows the programmer to define probe points
in the kernel and to perform specialized functions for data aggregation or for accessing
the kernel data structures. The main features for both Systemtap and DTrace are well
oriented towards online analysis putting less the emphasis on pattern description. They
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don’t provide a simple mechanism to describe a pattern composed of several events
where multiple instances of the same pattern type could be alive simultaneously at certain
periods during the analysis. The task of manually encoding such patterns across the
different probe handlers could be a rather challenging task.
1.2.3 General Purpose Programming Languages
General purpose programming languages (such as C, C++ and Java) in contrast with
Domain Specific Languages, are used to solve a wide variety of problems not necessarily
related to a particular field. General purpose programming languages could be further
divider into several other categories but they are out of the scope of our work. General
purpose programming languages, particularly object-oriented languages could very well
be used for patterns description. They actually provide a number of advantages over
Domain Specific Languages. First, the code is easily debugged using sophisticated and
dedicated debuggers. Second, since the programmer has the full control over the control
flow of the program, he may be able to better optimize his code for his well-defined
problem and therefore, achieve a faster program execution. However, using general
purpose programming languages for patterns description may result in a larger number
of lines of code, possibly making the program less trivial to undestand. Furthermore,
field experts will have to learn the programming language in order to maintain or update
the patterns in question.
Under this category, we identify the EXPERT analyzer tool discussed in 2.1. In our
work, we will be using a general purpose programming language for patterns description
in order to evaluate the performance of the dedicated approach and therefore be able to
compare it with our approach.
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1.2.4 Automata-Based Programming Languages
Automata-based programming, particularly finite state machine programming, consists
in describing the problem to solve in the form of a state machine composed of a finite
number of states, transitions and actions. The program evolves by transitioning from one
state to another depending on both, the current state and the input. This may enable one
or several actions to take place. Actions could take place when a transition is triggered
or when a state is entered or left.
A problem described in the form of a state machine can be represented by a state dia-
gram which is visually friendly. Furthermore, it is often easy to update such programs
where the modification usually involves adding or removing states and/or transitions.
Automata-based programming is used in many fields such as lexical and syntactic anal-
yses, modeling real-time applications for formal verifications, and intrusion detection.
In this chapter, we study Ragel, a state machine language and compiler, STAT an in-
trusion detection system based on FSM description of security patterns and the State
Machine Compiler SMC which is used in many fields and can compile the state machine
SM language into 14 different general purpose programming languages.
1.2.4.1 Ragel
Ragel (RAGEL, 2009) is a language for specifying state machines that can recognize
regular string expressions. It has a compiler that converts the state machine definitions
into six different target languages which are: C, C++, Objective-c, D, Java and Ruby.
The generated code tries to match patterns to the input favouring longer patterns over
shorter ones. Ragel can also generate the state machines in Graphviz’s Dot file format
for visualization. Ragel can optionally employ a state minimization algorithm which
reduces the number of states in a FSM by merging equivalent states. The algorithm runs
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Figure 1.7 Example illustrating the Ragel syntax
at O(n log(n)) where n is the number of states and requires O(n) memory storage.
A simple example that highlights the Ragel syntax is shown in Figure 1.7
The Ragel code is placed between double percent signs and braces, i.e. %%{ Ragel
code here... }%%. A single Ragel statement should be preceeded by double percent
signes. The machine shown in the example recognizes the two strings ’foo’ and ’bar’
and whenever one of them is detected, the variable res is set to 1. The variable res can
be later be accessed by the program written in one of the target languages supported by
Ragel. The main program passes to the FSM a pointer to the beginning of the data to be
processed and one pointing to the end of the buffer.
Language Operators Only the language operators which are relevant for our work
will be covered in this section. The language includes manipulation operators that allow
22
the programmer to specify the actions of the state machine (i.e. transition actions and
state actions) and to assign priorities to transitions. By assigning priorities to transitions,
the nondeterminism problem is eliminated. For instance, if two transitions are possible
for a given character, then the one with the higher priority will take precedence.
Finie State Machine’s Actions Actions are block of code that could be fired by an
FSM. The actions can be triggered by four different transition types identified by four
different action embedding operators:
1. Entering transition operator: >
2. Finishing transition operator: @
3. All transition operator: $
4. Leaving transition operator: %
The “entering transition” operator is used to specify the actions to be triggered by any
transition leaving the starting state. For instance, when the first character of a sequence
is encountered, a transition originating from the starting state is fired. Therefore, the
entering transitions, if any are specified, are executed.
The “finishing transition” operator is used to specify the actions to be triggered by
any transition leading into a final state. For instance, when the full character sequence
is matched, the state machine transitions to its final state. At this point, the finishing
transition action is executed. Finishing transition actions can be executed more than
once if the state machine has any internal transitions out of a final state.
The “all transition” operator is used to specify the actions to be triggered by any taken
transition in the finite state machine. For instance, for every character in the sequence
being matched, the “all transition” action is executed.
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The “leaving transition” operator is used to specify the actions to be triggered when the
state machine leaves its final state.
Ragel has other types of operators that help create new machines from previous ones.
These operators include: the Union operator which produces a machine that matches any
string in machine 1 or machine 2; the Intersection operator which produces a machine
that matches only the strings that are both in machine 1 and machine 2; the Difference
operator which produces a machine that matches the strings in machine 1 but are not in
machine 2.
Ragel for Pattern Description While Ragel provides many features such as FSM op-
timization and visualization, it does not allow us to specify different actions on different
transitions. In fact, the four types of transition actions it supports are mentioned pre-
viously in this section and none of them allows us to explicitly assign different actions
for different transitions. This is a major limitation for us since we may need to assign
different actions triggered by the occurrence of different kernel events in the trace. Not
only that, we sometimes need to assign two or more different actions triggered by the
occurrence of the same kernel event where the action to be executed will depend on the
current state of the FSM.
1.2.4.2 STATL
The State Transition Analysis Technique (STAT) (Eckmann et al., 2002) is a scenario-
based, intrusion detection system (IDS). STATL is the language it uses to describe the
attack scenarios which will be used by the STAT core to detect possible ongoing intru-
sions in a stream of events. We study in this section the STAT language and show how
applicable their approach could be for kernel trace analysis.
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States and Transitions The language provides constructs to define the states and tran-
sitions of a given attack scenario. Since any security breach is usually composed of one
or more steps, STAT maps every step of a given attack into a state in a finite state ma-
chine (FSM) representing the full attack scenario. Transitions between states represent
the evolution of the attack. A critical state could therefore be reached if the attack was
successful, or at least imminent. At this point, the notification action already specified
by the pattern writer will be triggered so that system administrators take the necessary
measures to solve the problem.
Scenario Definition A STATL scenario is an attack definition encoded into a finite
state machine description. A scenario is identified by its name and can have parameters
when being loaded. Scenario parameters are very useful when the user wants to set cer-
tain variables when loading the scenario, avoiding therefore the recompilation process.
Since more than once instance of the same scenario could coexist, the parameters are
accessible by the different instances as global constants.
Variable Declaration Inside the body of a scenario declaration, the language supports
the declaration of local, global variables and constants. Global variables are shared by
all the instances of the same scenario. As for local variable, each instance has its own
copy of it.
State Declaration Only one state has to be set as the initial state. When a new scenario
is loaded, it is created in its initial state. States can have optional assertions which are
tested prior to state entry. Only when the assertion - if present - is evaluated to true,
the state would be entered. Assertions can access the event fields, the local and global
variables. They cannot however affect their values. The affectation is performed only
inside the code blocks. Figure 1.8 illustrates the declaration of an initial state S1, and
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Figure 1.8 Example of State Declaration in STATL
another state S3 for which a state assertion is declared (counter > threashold). For the
same state S3, a code block is defined in which the action to take when the assertion is
evaluated to true, is specified. The code block is delimited by braces in which statements
are executed in order and can include regular assignments, for and while loops, if-then-
else conditions as well as procedure calls.
Transition Declaration Transistions are identified by their name and the pair of states
they connect together. The source and destination states could be the same and in this
case, the transition is called a loop transtition. Transistions are triggered when a partic-
ular event occurs in the trace. This event on which the transition is sensitive, needs to
be specified in the definition of the transition. In the example shown in Figure 1.9, the
transition t2 joins state S1 with state S2, and is sensitive on the event READ. As in the
case of states definition, transitions can have assertions as well as code blocks (actions).
The assertion above states that the euid and ruind fields of the event must differ. In that
case, the transition is fired and the state s2 is reached. The userid variable gets updated
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Figure 1.9 Example of Transition Declaration in STATL
as a result.
Evaluation Order Since transitions and states have assertions as well as code blocks
(actions to take) an execution order is needed and is as follows:
1. Evaluate the tranition assertion. If True, then
2. Evaluate the state assertion. If True, then
3. Execute transition code block, possibly modifying local and global environments;
4. Execute state code block, possibly modifying local and global environments;
Timers STATL supports the definition of timers which are initialized inside the code
block of a transition or a state. As in the case of regular variables, timers could be either
local or global. The timer is started at the current event time stamp. A timeout t is
specified and will be fired t seconds after the event time stamp. A transition needs to be
defined to be triggered upon the timer expiration. The timer will be reset if restarted in
another state code block.
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STATL for Pattern Description By the time the article (Eckmann et al., 2002) was
written, around 35 attack scenarios were decribed using the STAT language and the au-
thors claim that no limit in the expressiveness of the language was found. Furthermore, a
recent work has been done to automatically translate the large collection of rules written
for Snort - a popular intrusion detection system - into STATL scnearios. STATL pro-
vides many features not discussed here because they are out of the scope of our work.
We believe the STATL approach could be very well applicable for kernel traces for many
reasons. First the objective is quite similar; in both cases, patterns are composed of a
sequence of traced events that could be used to describe security threats or performance
problems. Second, the automata-based approach provides an easy way to describe com-
plex patterns from multiple simple ones, through the creation of synthetic events.
1.2.4.3 State Machine Compiler
The State Machine Language compiled by the State Machine Compiler SMC (Compiler,
2009), provides many of the features found in STATL described previously. The SMC
compiler is a free, open-source java program. It takes a state machine description written
using the SM language (.sm file), and converts it into one of the 14 following languages:
C, C++, C#, Groovy, Java, Lua, Objective-C, Python, Perl, PHP, Ruby, Scala, Tcl and
VB.net. The description of the SM language here doesn’t cover all of its aspects, how-
ever it highlights only those features that are relevant for us.
An example illustrating the syntax of the SM language is shown in Figure 1.10. The
example illustrates the declaration of two states S1 and S2. From State S1, a transition
called trans1 is possible. A main program should be typically receiving some input and
invoking transitions accordingly. When the trans1 transition is triggered, the transition
guard test() is evaluated, and if the result is True, the destination state S2 is reached.
State S2 is defined at the end of S1’s code block. Furthermore, the transition action
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Figure 1.10 Example of Scenario Declaration in SM
do something() is called.
SM Transitions Transitions are FSM functions that are called from the main program
upon the encounter of a certain event. These transitions can receive an argument list
which is typically used in the guard conditions or possibly in transitions actions.
Transition Actions The transition actions are enclosed between braces as shown in the
example in Figure1.10. Transition actions should be implemented in the target language,
e.g. in C, and linked with the code generated from the SM language. The implemented
function can have an argument list and needs to have a void return type or else, the FSM
simply ignores the return value.
Transition Guards Transition guards or assertions should be composed of valid state-
ments written in the target language source code. In fact, SMC copies the guard con-
dition verbatim into the generated output. The transition is taken only when the guard
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Figure 1.11 Example of State Actions Declarations in SM
condition is evaluated to true. Whenever a transition is not defined for a given state, any
call to this transition from the main program will trigger a default transition. The desti-
nation state of the Default transition could be the same as its origin state and therefore,
irrelevant transitions for this particular state won’t have any effect on the FSM.
SM States States can have multiple transitions with the same name and argument list
but with different transition guards. In this case, the order of precedence is the same
as the order they are defined in the .sm file. The only exception is that the unguarded
transition is given the least priority compared to guarded ones no matter where it is
defined in the .sm file. States can also have on-entry and/or on-exit actions.
State Entry/Exit Actions Actions triggered at a state entry or exit are declared as
shown in Figure 1.11. Entry/Exit actions are very useful to update some internal data
structures or start/stop a timer.
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SMC versus STATL
Similarities As our study shows, there are many similarities that the SM and the STAT
languages share. They include:
• Transitions with arguments list.
• Transition guards (or assertions): In both languages, assertions can access the
arguments list.
• Transition actions with arguments list: In both language, actions can access the
arguments list.
• State entry actions: In both languages, it is possible to define an action to be
executed upon any state entry.
It is important to realize that these common features are very important for patterns
description. In fact, transitions are to be triggered upon encountering certain events in
the kernel trace. The event fields are to be passed as arguments to the corresponding
transition. Based on specific conditions (or guards), possibly relying on the event fields,
a transition should take place or not. Then, whenever the transition occurs, actions need
to be taken to update some local or global variables that could be later used in future
assertions.
Differences There are some differences between the two languages though:
• In STATL it is possible to have state assertions unlike the SM language. However
this problem can be overcome simply by replicating the state’s assertion into every
transition heading towards this state.
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• The SM language allows the definition of state exit actions unlike the STAT lan-
guage. This is also a minor problem and could be solved by replicating all the
state exit actions into the transitions leaving the state.
• Consuming/Non-consuming/unwinding transitions: STATL defines three types of
transitions: Consuming, Non-consuming and unwinding transitions.
– Non-consuming transitions: According to STATL, a non-consuming tran-
sition is used to “represent a step of an occurring attack that does not prevent
further occurrences of attacks from spawning from the transisiont’s source
state”. In other words, when a non-consuming transitions fires, a new in-
stance of the same FSM is forked so that the origin state and the destination
state are both valid once the transition takes place.
– Consuming transitions: In contrast with non-consuming transitions, the fir-
ing of a consuming transition invalidates the origin state and therefore no
forking is required.
– Unwinding transitions: According to STATL, “the firing of an unwinding
transition from state Sy back to a previous state Sx for a certain scenario
instance, causes the deletion of all the scenario instances that were created
by the series of events that brought the unwinding instance from state Sx to
state Sy.”
In SMC, all transitions are naturally consuming which means that no forking nei-
ther deletion of other scenarios will take place. In order to support scenario forking
or deletion using SMC, one has to explicitely assign actions and implement them
in order to achieve such goals.
Given the flexibility of both languages, it turned out that it may be possible to manually
implement one language’s features in another in order to achieve the same goals.
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Choosing the SMC compiler We select the SMC compiler for our patterns descrip-
tion for many reasons. First, according to our study, the state-machine language provides
similar features to those offered by the STAT language; STAT being a popular Intrusion
Detection System having a large pool of attack scenarios described by the STAT lan-
guage. Second, the SMC compiler is a free, accessible, open-source project which is
important for us in order to perform our experimentations. Third, it turned out that the
features we found in STATL but were not present in the SMC State Machine language
could be easily implemented via the SMC transition actions.
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CHAPTER 2
TRACE ANALYZERS
In the previous chapter, we studied the pattern description languages used by some pop-
ular analysis tools. In this chapter, we focus more on the main features of some of the
trace analysis tools as well as on the optimization approaches they adopt. Some of these
tools are used for network intrusion detection while others for detecting performance
problems in parallel applications. While some of the studied tools analyze events of-
fline, others do so at runtime. Our main concern in this study is to see how applicable
their approaches could be, which would help us reach our goal for efficiently analyzing
large kernel traces.
2.1 EXPERT
The EXPERT analyzer (Wolf et al., 2004), is a tool that automatically detects perfor-
mance problems in OpenMP and MPI events saved in a trace file in the EPILOG format.
It is part of a lager project called KOJAK which includes user-space instrumentation
tools as well as a graphical user interface to show analysis results. EXPERT uses EARL,
a high-level interface which provides random access capabilities to single events in EPI-
LOG event traces.
2.1.1 EXPERT’s Architecture
The Expert’s overall architecture is shown in figure 2.1. Permission to reproduce the
EXPERT figure found in (Wolf et al., 2004), in this thesis, was granted by the article’s
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first author, Felix Wolf.
The EXPERT’s architecture is divided into two parts: the instrumentation component,
and the analysis component. The user program instrumentation uses three tracing mod-
ules: one to trace openMP calls (OPARI), a second module is used to trace user func-
tions (TAU), and a third module (PMPI) used to trace MPI calls. All three modules use
the EPILOG run-time library which standardizes the traced events format. The instru-
mented executable will generate a trace file in the EPILOG format upon execution. The
EXPERT’s analysis component takes the trace file as input, and uses the EARL library
to read the trace in one pass from the beginning till the end. At the end of the analy-
sis, a results report is generated and can be used by the EXPERT presenter for results
visualization.
2.1.2 Performance Properties
EXPERT’s performance properties are Python classes which identify inefficient behavior
in MPI and OpenMP applications including inefficient communication and synchroniza-
tion. As an example, the Late Sender property consists in finding the cases where the
sent message occurs much later than its corresponding blocking receive. Performance
properties register call back functions for every event of interest. EXPERT reads the
trace once from the beginning till the end, and invokes the call-back functions for every
registered event. Multiple call-back functions could exist for the same event. The call-
back functions can also access other events by following the links between the events
(e.g. a receive event linked to its corresponding send event) or by accessing the updated
state information such as the “message queue”, which is an internal data structure con-
taining all the events generated by the messages that are currently being transferred. An
enhanced version of EXPERT allows patterns to generate compound events (also known
as synthetic events) and to register for compound events generated by others. This helped
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Figure 2.1 The EXPERT architecture
solve the case where a performance property is a subproperty of a more general prop-
erty. Once a compound-event has been detected by a general pattern and published, a
more specialized pattern can now consume it. This prevents redundant computation to
occur from both pattern classes. Compound events also lead to more compact pattern
specifications.
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Figure 2.2 System Architecture
2.2 Frequent Pattern Mining
Frequent Pattern Mining for Kernel Trace Data (LaRosa et al., 2008) is a recent work
aiming at analyzing kernel traces to detect the most recurring interprocess communica-
tion patterns impacting the system’s performance. Recurring patterns may not be nec-
essarily composed of an ordered sequence of events due to the reordering introduced by
the scheduler. Temporally proximal events found in a kernel trace are treated as parallel
and therefore unordered during the analysis.
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2.2.1 System Architecture
The overall system architecture is shown in Figure 2.2. Permission to reproduce the
figure was granted by one of the authors named Li Xiong. The Linux kernel was in-
strumented using the Linux Trace Toolkit LTT. The events of interest were mainly the
system calls issued by the different processes running on the system as depicted in the
figure. A trace file containing these events is generated. Since the work aims at finding
the frequent unordered events forming a pattern, it would have to treat all the events
found in a trace as parallel. This would lead to a linear data growth in memory which
could result in a problem for large traces. Instead, the window slicing technique is used.
It consists in dividing the trace into event sequences of a window period, treating them
as parallel. The different events found in one window, form one record in the generated
database. Then the maximal frequent itemset mining is performed in order to find the
maximal frequent itemsets.
2.2.2 Discussion
The frequent pattern mining approach is useful to detect which process is the source of
system overhead when traditional tools such as top cannot. For instance the gtik version
2.0 produces a number of high-impact X programming calls. It was possible to identify
the itemset containing the list of events issued by gtik and are responsible for much
of the Xfree86’s work. This new approach is particularly useful for identifying which
processes are impacting the performance of the system, whether these processes are the
ones holding the CPU the most, or causing other processes to do so. However, it does
not allow us to find specific problematic patterns that could occur very rarely in a trace.
For instance, catching a potential deadlock is unlikely to occur whereas finding a denial
of service attack such as the SYN flood attack could very well be detected using this
approach.
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This approach has two main limitations for us: first, by relaxing the ordering constraints,
it won’t be possible to catch patterns that rely mostly on a sequence of ordered events.
For instance, attack scenarios usually consist of a sequence of two or more steps that
need to be ordered in time of occurrence so that the attack is successful. This is why
event ordering is very important for us. Second, frequent patterns occuring in a trace
aren’t the only potential source of performance bottlenecks. Some patterns occurring
maybe once or twice could have some drastic effects on the overall system performance.
2.3 ASAX
The Advanced Security Audit-trail Analysis on uniX, ASAX, (Habra et al., ) is a scenario-
based intrusion detection system that aims at analyzing audit trails to determine differ-
ent kinds of security breaches caused by external penetrations, internal penetrations and
viruses. External penetrations are caused by an unauthorized user who tries to access the
system. This is caught when sucessive login commands fail. Internal penetrations take
place when a constrained user tries to bypass his privileges. Viruses can also be caught
if a sequence of events found in the audit-trail can uniquely identify the virus. ASAX
uses the Russel language studied in 1.2.2.1, to describe any problematic occurrence of
events. This is helpful to detect known penetrations. Furthermore, ASAX supports de-
tecting unknown penetrations whenever a user activity deviates from his normal profiled
activities.
2.3.1 ASAX Features
In order to support different trace formats, ASAX defines the normalized audit file format
(NADF). Traces need to be converted first into the NADF format, using format adaptors,
for analysis. Due to the large size of audit traces, ASAX goes over the trace in just one
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pass analyzing it sequentially record after record. There is no way to access information
from a past event. To overcome the problem, relevant data from past events need to be
encapsulated into the set of active rules. One optimization idea it applies consists in
converting the boolean conditions found in the rules description into more appropriate
binary trees. For instance, in a given tree, if the current node’s boolean expression is
evaluated to false the left child is processed, otherwise the right one is. This is done in
order not to evaluate elemantary conditions in many cases for every record.
2.3.2 Discussion
ASAX’s interesting approach resides not only in the fact that it can detect predefined
problematic patterns, but also in detecting new problems which occur when a user’s
behavior deviates from his preestablished profiled suggesting that an intruder has suc-
cessfully accessed the system. Furthermore, by defining a normalized trace format, one
could use the ASAX analyzer as a universal trace analyzer. However, converting large
traces containing billions of events would be very costly. In terms of expressivity, the
Russel language was studied in the previous chapter suggesting that two or more in-
stances of the same pattern could not be easily expressed due to language limitation.
2.4 STAT
The State Transition Analysis Technique STAT (Vigna et al., 2000), is a scenario-based
Intrusion Detection System. Computer penerations are encoded in a finite state machine
that can take the system from an initial safe state to a final compromised state. It em-
ploys a flexible state-machine language for patterns description. The STAT Language
is covered in the previous chapter where we studied the different pattern description
languages.
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2.4.1 STAT Features
The STAT-based instrusion detection system translates attack scenarios (or scenario plu-
gins) written in the STATL language into C code, then compiles them into dynami-
cally linked libraries (.so) which are linked into the runtime architecture. Traces (audit
records) are generated from the operating systems’s event logging facilities or from a
network sniffer. They are preprocessed in order to filter out uninteresting events and to
encapsulate the relevant ones into the normalized STAT events.
A normalized STAT event has a type, a timestamp and a reference to the application-
specific event data. The runtime core loads a number of scenario plugins components.
The first scenario instance is created at plugin loading time, at it’s initial state. Depend-
ing on the scenario in question and the transition to be fired, new instances of the same
scenario may need to be forked. When an event is read, the core determines the set of
instances that may be interested in the event.
STATL identifies three types of transitions: consuming, non-consuming and unwinding.
When a non-consuming transition is fired, a new scenario instance is forked. This occurs
when the fired transition does not prevent further occurrences of the same attack from
spawning from the scenario’s initial state.
For instance, if the first step of a 2 steps attack occured on behalf of a certain user, it
doesn’t invalidate the fact that another user may start the attack from the first step and
therefore a new finite state machine for the second user needs to be forked. In contrast,
consuming transitions invalidate the source state and therefore no forking is required. A
third transition type is called unwinding. In some cases, a particular event may require
the return to an earlier state and at the same time, invalidate all the scenario instances
that were forked from this earlier state.
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2.4.2 Discussion
Several tools based on the STAT core framework have been implemented. For instance,
USTAT is a Unix host-based IDS. It uses the Sun Microsystems Basic Security Mod-
ule for data tracing of up to 125 event types of which only 35 are used by USTAT. It
checks for scenarios causing a security violation such as non-root user making changes
in restricted-write directories.
The STAT core was developped using the GNU build system and was ported to different
operating systems including Solaris, Linux and Windows NT. The STAT approach is
very interesting and applicable for pattern detection in kernel traces. The main features
of the STATL language such as transitions guards and actions are also found in the State
Machine Language, having an accessible, open-source compiler which we will be using
in our work. Also, by doing so, we avoid converting large traces with billions of events
into STAT events which is a very time consuming task for traces of several gigabytes.
Alternatively, the conversion could be done at runtime increasing therefore the analysis
execution time.
2.5 DTrace
DTrace is a dynamic instrumentation framework integrated into the Solaris 10 and Open
Solaris operating systems. Dynamic instrumentation is architecture specific and induces
a performance impact only when tracing is activated. The D scripting language which is
derived from a large subset of C, is used to control tracing and to specify probe points in
the kernel. It can also be used to define the actions to take whenever each probe is hit.
A D program can access types and symbols from the kernel and modules which could be
very useful for run-time analysis and to generate warnings when an unexpected condition
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Figure 2.3 DTrace Architecture
takes place. The D script file is translated into C code and then compiled into a binary
kernel module. More details about the D language can be found in the previous chapter.
We show in Figure 2.3 an overview of the overall DTrace System Architecture. The
lower part of the figure shows the modules residing in the kernel space that are called
the DTrace providers. These providers are capable of instrumenting different parts of
the kernel. All the user-space processes that use the dtrace library are called consumers.
They are depicted in the upper part of the figure. There are many details concerning the
dynamic probe insertion in the kernel as well as the events buffering but they are outside
of the scope of this work.
2.5.1 Discussion
Online trace analysis is possible using DTrace. It provides a mechanism to register call
back function for every event of interest, using the D language. These functions, called
at runtime, may impact the overall system performance, and thus they should be very
carefully implemented. Using DTrace, one could easily interfere with the normal execu-
tion of the kernel to achieve the desired behavior. While this approach is interesting, it
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does not allow off-line analysis, and any attempt to perform complex analysis at run-time
may considerably slow down the system.
2.6 Discussion
We have seen in this chapter the different architectures used by some popular trace analy-
sis tools. A common adopted approach was the definition of a normalized event format in
order to support different trace formats once the conversion is performed. Furthermore,
we noticed that the majority of the tools came up with their own Domain Specific Lan-
guages to control and analyze traces, such as DTrace, SystemTap, ASAX and STATL.
While introducing a new language presents a number of advantages for one particular
tool, it incurs an additional maintenance cost that we are trying to avoid. In addition, we
were not able to find a common pattern description language adopted by a majority of
the tools. Table 2.1 summarizes the different features of the studied tools:
• Static instrumentation: consists in modifying the source code of a system and
recompiling it so that tracing it is possible.
• Dynamic instrumentation: consists in adding tracepoints dynamically into a run-
ning system with no source code modifications.
• Normalized events: consists in the usage of software modules dedicated to nor-
malize a trace format.
• Random access: consists in the ability to randomly access any event in the trace
in contrast with the sequential read of the trace.
• Synthetic events: consists in supporting the definition of higher level events com-
posed of multiple primitive ones.
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Table 2.1 Summary Table.
• Domain Specific Language: consists in using a DSL language for trace analysis as
defined in section 1.2.1.
• General Purpose Language: consists in using a general purpose language for trace
analysis as defined in section 1.2.3.
• Automata-Based Language: consists in using an automata-based language for
trace analysis as defined in section 1.2.4.
• Predefined behavior detection: consists in detecting a well definied problematic
behavior by going over the trace.
• New behavior detection: consists in the ability to detect new behavior that deviates
from the normal, profiled behavior.
• Offline analysis: consists in performing all the analysis offline, after the trace has
been generated completely.
• Online analysis: consists in performing runtime validation of the trace.
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In terms of architecture, the tools do share some parts in common. A tracing compo-
nent collects the required events and saves them in a trace. The trace is processed by
an analysis component which registers call back functions for every event of interest.
This component is able to perform different kinds of analysis based on the description
implemented by its tool’s domain specific language.
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CHAPTER 3
ARTICLE: SCENARIO-BASED APPROACH FOR KERNEL TRACE
ANALYSIS
3.1 Abstract
Performance bottlenecks, malicious activities, programming bugs and other kinds of
problematic behavior could be accurately detected on production systems if the relevant
events were being monitored and logged. This could be achieved through kernel level
tracing where every time a relevant event occurs, the information is saved in a trace file
to be inspected during post-mortem analysis. While collecting the information from the
kernel has a very low impact, the offline analysis is typically performed remotely with
no overhead on the system whatsoever.
This article presents an automata-based approach for analyzing traces generated by the
kernel of an operating system. Some typical patterns of problematic behavior are iden-
tified and described using the State Machine Language. These patterns are fed into an
offline analyzer which efficiently and simultaneously checks for their occurrences even
in traces of several gigabytes. The analyzer achieves a linear performance with respect
to the trace size. The remaining factors impacting its performance are also discussed.
As far as we know, this is the first work that targets patterns description for offline kernel
trace analysis.
47
3.2 Introduction
By carefully examining execution traces of a computer system, experts can detect prob-
lematic behavior caused by software design defects, inefficiencies as well as malicious
activities. Kernel tracing can often reveal the main source of such problems. Tracing
consists in instrumenting the kernel code to precisely record its behavior at execution
time.
It is now possible to achieve low overhead, low disturbance tracing of multi-core Linux
systems with the Linux Trace Toolkit next generation (LTTng). It provides precise,
low impact, highly reentrant tracing and is used for efficiently debugging large clusters
(Bligh et al., 2007) as well as narrowing time constraints problems in real-time embed-
ded applications (Desnoyers and Dagenais, 2006b). The information about the filesys-
tem, inter-process communication, system calls, memory management and networking
is efficiently collected, precisely time stamped and saved at runtime. This information
is used to debug the monitored system and a large class of problems may be detected,
such as excessive disk swapping, excessive threads migration, frequent writes of small
data chunks to disk, locking problems, security problems and many others. Once the
execution trace is available, the objective is thus to automatically validate it against a
pool of predefined problematic patterns.
3.2.1 Motivations and Goals
The most popular kernel trace analysis tools that help simplify the debugging task pro-
vide offline event filtering and trace visualization. These tools include LTTV (LTTng,
2009), QNX Momentics (QNX, 2009) and Windriver Workbench (Windriver., 2009).
Offline filters are used to highlight the events of interest satisfying a set of constraints.
Visualizers, such as the Gantt chart of the control flow view (e.g. LTTV (LTTng, 2009)),
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help the developer seek throughout the trace and determine visually any sort of unex-
pected behavior.
Even when these tools are used, validating the existence of a set of problematic patterns
in one or several large traces remains a manual and time consuming task. This motivated
the development of an automated approach to represent patterns of problematic behavior
and to automatically and simultaneously check for their existence in one or several large
traces.
3.2.2 Related Work
Frequent pattern mining for kernel trace data (LaRosa et al., 2008) is a recent work
aiming at the detection of recurring runtime execution patterns, such as inter-process
communication patterns. The work finds the set of all temporally proximal events that
occured frequently in a trace. This helped identify the processes that are heavy con-
sumers of system resources but still remain invisible to traditional tools such as top. This
approach is interesting but doesn’t allow validating the trace against a set of predefined
patterns which may occur very rarely in the trace.
Systemtap (Eigler, 2006) and DTrace (Cantrill et al., 2004) provide scripting languages
resembling C that are used to enable probe points in the kernel (instrumentation sites)
and to implement their associated handlers. These handlers could be used to perform
run-time checking and to generate warnings when something bad happens. The script
file is translated into C code and then compiled into a binary kernel module. While this
approach is interesting, it does not allow off-line analysis, and any attempt to perform
complex analysis at run-time may considerably slow down the system. Furthermore, a
C-like language does not provide a simple way to describe complex patterns at a high
level of abstraction.
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In parallel computing, many tools exist that are able to automatically detect performance
problems in MPI, OpenMP or hybrid applications. These tools include Paradyn (Miller
et al., 1995) and EXPERT (Wolf et al., 2004). EXPERT instruments the application’s
source code so that a trace file in the EPILOG format is generated upon running the pro-
gram. The performance patterns are supplied to the tool and are written as Python classes
implementing a common interface, making them exchangeable from the perspective of
the tool. These pattern classes register callback functions for every event of interest and
are capable of accessing additional events by retrieving the updated state information or
by following some event dependencies. The LTTng Viewer also maintains an updated
system state information as kernel events are processed. We consider implementing a
similar approach for kernel traces using the State Machine Language to describe differ-
ent kinds of problematic patterns at a higher level of abstraction.
Using Finite State Machines to describe patterns is found in the field of network based
Intrusion Detection, particularly in the misuse detection systems or scenario-based sys-
tems. The State Transition Analysis Technique (STAT) (Eckmann et al., 2002), devel-
oped at the university of Santa Barbara, is used to model computer penetrations using
Finite State Machines (FSM) called attack scenarios. Each scenario is composed of
states and transitions. Transitions are triggered by the occurrence of particular events on
the network and can take the system from an initial safe state to a final compromised
state. The main features of the STAT language such as transition guards and actions are
also found in the State Machine Language (Compiler, 2009) which we will be using in
our work because of its open-source implementation.
By the time the article (Eckmann et al., 2002) was written, around 35 attack scenarios
were decribed using the STAT language, and the authors claim that no limit in the ex-
pressiveness of the language was found. Furthermore, a recent work has been done to
automatically translate the large collection of rules written for SNORT - a popular in-
trusion detection system - into STATL scnearios. We believe the STAT approach could
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be very well applicable to kernel traces for many reasons. First the objective is quite
similar; in both cases, patterns are composed of a sequence of events that could be used
to describe either security threats or performance problems. Second, the automata-based
approach provides an easy way to describe complex patterns from multiple simple ones,
through the creation of synthetic events.
Ragel (RAGEL, 2009) is a popular state machine compiler used mainly to generate lex-
ical analyzers and to validate user input. The generated code tries to match patterns to
the input, favouring longer patterns over shorter ones. The Ragel language provides four
types of transition actions. They allow the FSM developer to execute a particular action
whenever the state machine transitions from one state to another. However none of the
provided actions allows us to explicitly assign different actions for different transitions,
from any random state in the FSM.
3.3 Faulty Behavior
While the system will be easily extensible at a later time, it was important to start by
collecting a large representative set of problematic patterns touching on several fields
such as security, software testing and performance debugging. For sake of brevity, a
representative subset is described here.
3.3.1 Security
The SYN flood attack is a denial of service attack that consists in flooding a server with
half-open TCP connections. Signs of a SYN flood attack may be found in a kernel trace
if the relevant events are instrumented. It would be very inefficient to manually look for
patterns caused by such an attack, thus the interest in automating the lookup process.
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Escaping the chroot jail is another attack type that can be caught on a system: a privi-
leged process (euid=0) may want to confine its access to a subtree of the filesystem by
calling the chroot() system call. If this process ever tries to open a file after the call
to chroot(), without a chdir(), then this is considered to be a security violation (Chen
et al., 2004). Indeed, a malicious user can trick the program to open the system file
../../../../../etc/shadow for example. The right way to proceed would be to call chdir(“/”)
right after the call to chroot() preventing the user from ever escaping the chroot jail.
Even though they are rare, Linux viruses do exist and they could be caught on a traced
system. The approach we propose is different from the ones used in anti-virus software.
Whenever a new virus is discovered, it could be executed on a virtual machine running
an instrumented Linux kernel to record all its interactions with the operating system.
This interaction, consisting in a sequence of system calls, identifies the behavior of that
particular virus and we can look for it when analyzing traces generated from production
systems. For example, in (Desnoyers and Dagenais, 2006a), the virus Linux.RST.B
was observed generating the following actions: it executes a temporary file “.para.tmp”
which creates three other processes; It opens and lists the current directory and modifies
the binary files in /bin. By analyzing a kernel trace, it should be possible to detect a
viral behavior automatically while diagnosing at the same time, some other security and
performance problems.
3.3.2 Software Testing
Shared resources often require locks to be held before accessing them, to avoid race
conditions. In the Linux kernel, locking is more complex than in user-space, due to the
different states the kernel could be in (preemption enabled, disabled, servicing an irq,
etc.). Validating each and every lock acquire has already been implemented in lockdep,
the Linux kernel lock validator (Validator., ). For instance, it makes sure at run-time that
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any spinlock being acquired when interrupts are enabled has never been acquired previ-
ously in an interrupt handler. The reason is that the interrupt could happen at anytime,
in particular when the spinlock is already held, deadlocking therefore the corresponding
CPU. Activating this option requires recompiling the kernel and adds a continuous slight
overhead on the system. Instead, using a kernel trace and a posteriori analysis, the same
kind of validations may be performed.
Another detectable programming bug consists in accessing a file descriptor after it was
closed. This illustrates a more general class of programming errors where the usage
specifications state that two particular events are logically and temporally connected.
3.3.3 Performance Debugging
Some inefficiencies in software could be detected from I/O events. For instance, frequent
writes of small data chunks to disk would impact the overall system performance and
are to be avoided. Similarly, reading the data that was just written to disk, or reading
twice the same data, or even overwriting the data that was just written are all signs of
inefficiencies that are visible in a kernel trace.
Multimedia applications, and more generally soft real-time applications, are character-
ized by implicit temporal constraints that must be met to provide the desired QoS (Abeni
et al., 2002). Assuming that tracing the kernel scheduler has a negligible impact on the
system, we can verify that temporal constraints are satisfied for one or multiple real-time
applications, and whenever they’re not, we can show what the system was doing at that
time.
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3.4 Automata-Based Approach
We first describe in 3.4.1 the state machine language and we show how it was used to
model the three following scenarios: chroot jail escape, locking validation and real-time
constraints checking.
3.4.1 SM Language
Describing the various patterns using the SM Language (Compiler, 2009) is straight-
forward. Even though many existing languages are capable of expressing the different
scenarios described in section 3.3, a state-transition language was selected for the fol-
lowing reasons:
1. Simplicity and expressiveness: the language is easy to use and provides enough
features to express new, yet to be defined, scenarios (Eckmann et al., 2002).
2. Domain independent: the language may be tailored to support a wide range
of patterns that relate to different fields. In the Intrusion Detection field, state-
transition language is widely used to model attack signatures (Vigna et al., 2000),
(Eckmann et al., 2002). In model checking and Software Security, it is equally
used for scenario-oriented modeling to examine security properties (Chen and
Wagner, 2002), (Christodorescu and Jha, 2003) or to verify and validate software
use cases (AsmL (Barnett et al., 2003)).
3. Synthetic events: the state-transition approach lets us easily generate synthetic
events from lower level primary events (Eckmann et al., 2002). Consider for in-
stance the SYN flood attack detection. We first model a half-open TCP connection
using the state machine shown in Figure 3.1. When the server receives a connec-
tion request, the system moves to state S1. The server sends the acknowledgment
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Figure 3.1 Detecting half-open TCP connections
and a timer is started. If the client sends back the acknowledgment, the system
returns to state S0. Otherwise, when the timeout occurs, the system moves to S2
and a synthetic event is generated called “halfopentcp”. Frequent occurrences of
this synthetic event would probably mean that an attack is taking place. Synthetic
events are very useful when describing even more complex patterns.
The State Machine Language supports the declaration of a state and the transitions orig-
inating from it. Each transition has a name, an optional argument list, an optional transi-
tion guard, a destination state and a transition action. The guard is a boolean expression
written in the target language source code and copied verbatim into the generated out-
put. If the expression is evaluated to true then the transition is triggered and the transition
action is executed. The destination state could be defined in another state machine de-
clared in another file for simplicity. The transition actions are functions implemented
in the target language and could have a regular argument list. Similarly, every state can
have on-entry actions as well as on-exit actions than could be useful to start/stop a timer
or update some internal data structures.
3.4.2 Escaping a chroot jail
An automaton showing the sequence of system calls that may result in a security viola-
tion is shown in Figure 3.2. The vulnerability is explained in 3.3.1. A call to chroot()
brings the system to state S1 and saves the process id. Furthermore, a new FSM is forked
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Figure 3.2 Escaping the chroot jail
Table 3.1 SM Code Snippet
in case a new chroot() call is issued by another process. The FSM fork is initiated by the
transition action fork fsm(). Any process issuing a successive call to chdir(“/”), brings
back the corresponding FSM to state S0, whereas a call to open() brings it to S2 and
generates a warning. The machine transitions to a fourth Exit state, not shown here, and
it happens whenever the exit() call is issued by the process.
We show in table 3.1 a self explanatory code snippet of the language describing state S1
from Figure 3.2. From state S1, two transitions are possible, chdir() and open(). If the
encountered event is a call to chdir, then the transition guard (between square brackets)
is evaluated. In this case, if the functions same pid() and check new dir() return true,
then the transition is triggered and the system moves back to state S0. It is also possible
to have a transition action (between braces). In our example, the call to the function
warning() occurs only if the corresponding transition guard is evaluated to true.
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Figure 3.3 Locking Validation
3.4.3 Locking Validation
We generate in Figure 3.3 an automaton that will validate a subset of the kernel locking
rules. The event irq entry() brings the system to state Irq Handling and event irq exit()
brings it back to its normal state. Any lock could either be acquired from the normal
state (S0 or Holding Lock) or the Irq Handling state. If a lock being acquired when
interrupts are enabled has been previously acquired from the Irq Handling state, the
system transitions to state Potential Deadlock. The reason is that once this lock is taken
and before it gets released, if the code is interrupted by the same handler which tries
to acquire the same lock, then a deadlock occurs. Similarly, if a lock previously taken
when irqs were on, is now being acquired from an irq handler, then the system should
also transition to the state Potential Deadlock.
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Suppose the system is in state Holding Lock on a particular processor, where a lock is
being held on behalf of a certain process. If this process gets scheduled out, then there is
another potential deadlock due to the fact that some other process may require the same
lock.
Nested locks, taken on behalf of the same process could deadlock the system if they are
not taken in the right order. When the system is in the state Holding Lock, the arrival
of a new event lock acquire would trigger the corresponding transition. This results in
a call to a function that generates trees of lock dependencies implemented in a hashing
table. At the end of the analysis, if a cycle is found, then there is a potential deadlock
and the involved locks are shown. The return address, which is a traced event argument,
can help identify the code section responsible of holding the lock.
One interesting case was found in function copy pte range() in mm/memory.c which
generated a cycle in our analysis. The suspicious code sequence that caused the problem
is abstracted in Table 3.2. The function receives pointers to two mm struct structures
and always locks the destination page table lock spinlock, followed by the source lock.
If another CPU is doing the copy but with the reversed parameters, then the locks would
be taken in the opposite order and a deadlock can occur. After further investigation, we
noticed that a call to this function is initiated by a call to copy process() in fork.c which
is called when forking a process. This function calls dup mm() which allocates memory
for a new mm struct which becomes the dst mm shown in Table 3.2. Since no other
processor could be using the newly initialized structure as being the src mm in function
copy pte range(), there is no potential deadlock. However, this shows how our approach
was useful to identify suspicious code sequences.
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Table 3.2 Suspicious Code Sequence
Figure 3.4 Real-Time Constraints Checking
3.4.4 Real-time Constraints Checking
To support soft real-time applications, the kernel should respect the application’s tempo-
ral constraints and therefore a predictable schedule is desired (Abeni et al., 2002). Such
applications may require periodic scheduling where the period is derived from the frame
rate of an audio/video stream for example. We show in Figure 3.4 a detailed state ma-
chine that enables us to check if the application’s execution period has been respected
throughout the life of the trace. Whenever it’s not, we show the list of events that hin-
dered the application’s scheduling.
From state Sleeping, the transition schedule in() brings the FSM to the Running state
and saves the event time stamp; it also computes the difference between every two con-
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secutive schedule in() events. If the result is greater than a user specified threshold, a
warning is generated. The event time stamp displayed by the warning() call, can then
be used to determine all the preceding events once the trace is opened using the Linux
Trace Toolkit Viewer (LTTV). From the Running state, the event schedule out() brings
the FSM back to the Sleeping state. The time stamp of this event is also used to com-
pute the assigned time slice for the application so that the transition could also trigger a
warning when the time slice is less than expected.
3.5 Implementation
We used the Linux Trace Toolkit LTTng, a low-impact, open-source kernel tracer, to
instrument the kernel events required by the patterns description. We used the SMC
compiler to generate C code for the state machines written in the SM language. The
compiler is an open-source java program that supports code generation in 14 different
languages.
For every event required by a given pattern, the analyzer registers callback functions with
the trace reader and visualizer program LTTV. The program reads the trace sequentially
in one pass. When a registered event is encountered, the analyzer calls the corresponding
transition for every related state machine. There, if the transition guard is evaluated to
true, the transition action is executed before entering the destination state and returning
control to the analyzer.
In some cases, when a transition is triggered, a new FSM of the same type needs to be
forked. This is referred to as a non-consuming transition type in STATL terminology
(see example in 3.4.2). Whenever required, a transition action can request a fork from
the analyzer, generating therefore a new instance of the FSM.
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In other cases, such as the locking validation pattern, one finite state machine per CPU
is enough. There, the analyzer determines on which CPU the event occurred, and only
calls the transition of the FSM for that particular CPU.
The FSM approach offers great flexibility to model, update and optimize one or several
patterns. When we instrumented the events of interest for the locking validation pattern,
we noticed that the irq entry and exit events are not needed because the information
could be determined from the lock acquire() event. At this point, we simply eliminated
the Irq Handling state from our FSM.
We study the performance of the analyzer and we compare the performance of the
automata-based approach with that of a dedicated implementation in section 3.6. The
dedicated implementation is implemented in C and statically linked to the analyzer. Its
internal data structures are updated upon encountering relevant events without any FSM
invocation.
3.6 Performance
We instrumented the Linux kernel version 2.6.26 using LTTng and the tests were per-
formed on a Pentium 4 with 512 MB of RAM. In table 3.3 we show the execution time
of our analyzer to look up 3 different patterns: real-time constraints, file descriptors and
the chroot patterns. Our results show that the execution time is linear with respect to the
trace size. In fact, the performance of the analyzer depends on three other factors: the
number of coexisting finite state machines, their complexity (i.e. memory usage per state
and transition) and the frequency of relevant events in the trace triggering a transition.
The number of coexisting finite state machines depends on the pattern in question. For
instance, checking the file descriptors usage required one FSM per process accessing one
file descriptor, whereas for the real-time checking we used just one FSM for the Movie
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Table 3.3 Performance Results
Player (mplayer) process. We obtained similar execution times due to the fact that event
sched schedule() was occurring more frequently than events read() and write().
Another factor impacting the performance of the analyzer is the following, consider the
locking validation pattern in Figure 3.3. Even when the current FSM state is S0, every
encountered sched schedule() event would result in calling the corresponding transi-
tion which is irrelevant in state S0. This will call a default transition which maintains
the current state and returns control to the analyzer. Instead, the analyzer could have
skipped this step since, from the current state, there is no transition sensitive to the event
sched schedule().
The performance of the FSM checker was 4.5% slower than the dedicated version when
validating the locking pattern. This was expected because it dealt with frequently oc-
curring events leading to frequent transitions between states. However, our approach is
more generic and the overhead is often acceptable in offline analysis.
We show in Table 3.4 the performance of the analyzer when validating the file descrip-
tor pattern against traces of different sizes, and compare it with the analyzer’s perfor-
mance without invoking the FSMs, but only registering empty callback functions for the
6 events of interest. They are the following system calls: close(), open(), read(), write()
and dup(), as well as the process exit() kernel event. The slowdown is computed by
comparing the execution time between the two configurations of the analyzer. The first
4 traces shown in the table were taken while running 1 dbench client, while the last trace
was taken while running the full compilation of gcc v.4.2.0. The analysis time increases
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Table 3.4 Slowdown of the analyzer due to FSM invocation with respect to its perfor-
mance with empty callbacks
non-linearly with respect to the trace size for the two different tests. The slowdown was
much higher for the gcc trace, having fewer relevant events than 2 of the other smaller
traces. The computed slowdown suggests a direct correlation with the maximum number
of coexisting finite state machines handled by the analyzer. For instance, the gcc com-
pilation generated much more coexisting FSMs than running one dbench client due to
the numerous processes (accessing different file descriptors) generated by the makefile.
This resulted in a larger impact on the analyzer’s performance.
We fixed the trace size to 500 MB and varied the number of dbench clients. The number
of clients is directly proportional to the maximum number of coexisting FSMs during
the analysis. The results in Figure 3.5 show the slowdown percentage with respect to
the maximum number of coexising FSMs in the analyzer, for traces of the same size.
The slowdown is directly proportional to the maximum number of FSMs handled by the
analyzer. This is expected because the analyzer invokes sequentially all the FSMs in the
list for every relevant event, whether the event is needed at the FSM’s current state or
not.
By carefully selecting which events to trace, it may be possible to reduce the execution
time even further. For instance, the first version of the locking validation pattern required
the events enable irq() and disable irq() to deduce in which context a given lock was
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Figure 3.5 Fixing trace size to 500MB, varying the number of dbench clients
acquired. It turned out that this information is available at the site where the lock is
being acquired. This reduced the number of events to trace resulting in a smaller trace
and a faster analysis.
3.7 Conclusion
We presented an automata-based approach to represent some generic patterns of prob-
lematic behavior that might occur on production systems. The generated finite state ma-
chines can be easily maintained, expanded or even be used as synthetic events to model
more complex scenarios. We implemented an analyzer that validates the existence of
such patterns simultaneously in large traces and in one pass.
When dealing with a large number of FSM instances of the same pattern, the analyzer
suffers a slowdown directly proportional to the number of coexisting FSMs. The ded-
icated approach for the locking pattern was only 4.5% faster than the automata-based
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approach suggesting that the overhead of using finite state machines for execution, and
not just for modeling, is acceptable especially in post-mortem analysis.
3.7.1 Future Work
One problem with our implementation is the fact that for a given scenario, a relevant
event will trigger a function call whether the event is needed in the scenario’s current
state or not. This could be avoided if the analyzer knows beforehand the list of states
for which at least one transition is sensitive given the current states. Ideally, the analyzer
should only invoke the state machine when the event could trigger a transition from
the current state. Also, when validating a trace against a set of predefined patterns, the
analyzer should drop the ones that require at least one event that is not traced, assuming
that the information about all the traced events is present in the trace header.
Further explorations could be done to support the definition and use of synthetic events.
This will allow synthesizing more complex scenarios from multiple simple ones.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS AND COMPLEMENTARY RESULTS
In this Chapter we briefly discuss the methodology for implementing and checking for
the existence of a new pattern, using the automata-based approach. Then we provide
some complementary results that were not included in the journal article.
4.1 General Methodology
The following steps illustrate how a new problematic behavior can be modeled using a
finite state machine, and fed to the analyzer for validation.
1. Problem definition: The problem to be modeled needs to be clearly defined. It
usually involves a sequence of events, not necessarily temporally proximal. The
sequence of events satisfying certain conditions constitute the core of the problem.
As an example, a problem could be defined as accessing a file descriptor after it
was closed. Another problem would be defined as accessing the locks in a wrong
order from two or more sites, which may result in a deadlock. The problem could
be a security violation, a performance bottleneck or any other sort of undesired
behavior. Once the problem is clearly defined, it is possible to proceed to the next
step.
2. Instrumentation: Different problems may require different events to be moni-
tored. Therefore, one has to carefully determine the instrumentation sites in the
kernel in order to insert the desired tracepoints. In one of our implemented pat-
terns, we wanted to trace when the interrupts are enabled or disabled. However,
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it turned out that this information was available at the site where a lock is being
acquired. Since the latter event, also relevant for our analysis, was able to provide
us with the needed information about the interrupts status, we dropped the instru-
mentation of enabling and disabling the interrupts. If the instrumentation is static,
i.e. the source code is modified, then kernel recompilation is required.
3. Tracing the system: The system should be set to run under regular load, while
tracing is activated. If possible, all the necessary conditions that would make
the system exhibit the undesired behavior should be provided. Ideally, only the
relevant tracepoints should be activated along with context switching events and,
of course, a system state dump at the start of tracing.
4. Implementation: Modeling the problem in a finite state machine is straight for-
ward. As an example, the chroot jail escape shown in Chapter 4, illustrates how
the different states and transitions of the finite state machine are described. The
occurrence of a certain event in the trace, satisfying a certain condition, would
typically trigger a transition in the finite state machine. For instance, the event
irq entry() would result in a transition towards the IRQ handling state while the
event irq exit() would result in a transition leaving the IRQ handling state.
5. Guards and Actions: Besides the high level of abstraction the FSMs offer, a ma-
jor feature they provide is the ability to define transition guards and actions. The
transition guard is a boolean expression in which all the necessary conditions for
taking the transition are provided. When using the SMC compiler to generate C
code from the modeled FSMs, transition guards are copied verbatim into the gen-
erated output. In other words, one can provide a boolean expression composed
of one or more function calls as a transition guard. These functions need to be
implemented in C and not in the SM language. This provides a great flexibility
by being able to use all the power of C and not limit ourselves with a subset of C
operators as was the case in other Domain Specific Languages such as the D or the
67
SystemTap languages. Similarly, transition actions need also to be implemented in
the target source code. Their main purpose is threefold: first, they can be used to
update the internal data structures and variables local to every state machine. For
example, if one FSM per process is required, a variable pid would be required to
identify the represented process. Second, transition actions can be used to perform
all kinds of analysis based on the received event arguments. For instance, a tran-
sition action could compute and store the time spent in a particular state. Last but
not least, transition actions are ideal to use the analyzer’s API. This is described in
the following step.
6. Analyzer’s API usage: The analyzer offers an API which provides an added flex-
ibility for patterns description. The API is typically used in the transition action.
We have seen in Chapter 4 that multiple instances of the same pattern can coexist.
For instance, when checking if no file descriptor was accessed after being closed,
one pattern per process accessing a file descriptor was required. In order to do
so, new FSMs need to be forked upon the occurrence of the close() event. This
is achieved using the fork FSM() API called from the transition action. Similarly,
when the FSM reaches a state from which it cannot evolve anymore, it should
be able to request its self destruction from the analyzer and therefore freeing the
memory it consumed. This is achieved via the call destroy FSM(). Other vari-
ants of this call could exist as well. For instance, whenever a particular event is
encountered, an FSM could ask the analyzer to destroy all the instances of the
same pattern type. Furthermore, the FSMs can ask the analyzer to log a warning
message.
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4.2 Performance Analysis and Scalability
In Chapter 4, we showed how the performance of the analyzer drops as the number
of coexisting FSMs rises. This was mainly due to the fact that the analyzer needs to
invoke all the forked FSMs for every encoutered event of interest. When the number of
coexisting FSMs is relatively high, a frequent occurrence of relevant events resulted in
a 275% slowdown. The pattern in question consisted in checking that no file descriptor
has been accessed after being closed.
For this particular pattern, the number of coexisting FSMs during the analysis depends
on the number of processes accessing a file descriptor. For instance, if 10 processes
have closed 3 file descriptors, and never exited, a total of 30 FSMs would be handled
simultaneously by the analyzer. Furthermore, if one event is consumed by one FSM,
there is no need to keep on invoking the rest of the FSMs of the same type. The reason is
simple: there is no two different FSMs for the same tuple (pid, fd) where pid is a process
id and fd is the file descriptor the process is using.
4.2.1 Optimization
In many cases, an event would be consumed by at most one FSM. A simple but effective
optimization mechanism is introduced to skip the invocation of the rest of the FSMs
once the event is consumed by one of them. It consists of the analyzer’s API skip FSM()
called from within a transition action code block. When this function returns, and control
is transferred back to the analyzer, the analyzer breaks from the main loop which was
invoking all the FSMs in turn, and forces it to jump to the next event.
To study the performance improvement, the following test is conducted. Five traces of
500MB were taken while running respectively for each, one, two, five, ten and twenty
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Table 4.1 Table showing the slowdown obtained with respect to the analyzer’s perfor-
mance when it only registers empty callback functions for the relevant events.
dbench clients. A higher number of dbench clients implies a larger number of coexisting
FSMs handled simultaneously by the analyzer. In Table 4.1 we show a summary of
the obtained results. First, we notice that the number of coexisting FSMs increases
proportionally with the number of dbench clients. This is expected because each client
is an additional process accessing multiple file descriptors. Second, the number of forked
FSMs as well as the number of relevant events remain relatively constant for a fixed trace
size.
Three different configurations of the analyzer are executed. The first consists in read-
ing the full trace with empty callback functions for the six events of interest which are
the following system calls: open(), close(), read(), write(), and dup(), as well as the
process exit() kernel event. For the remaining two configurations, the slowdown is com-
puted with respect to the first one. The second configuration consists in invoking all the
registered FSMs upon encountering a relevant event. The results are shown in Figure
4.1. The third configuration involved skipping unnecessary FSM invokations whenever
possible. This is possible since, in this particular pattern, any event cannot be consumed
by more than one FSM. Therefore, whenever the invoked FSM consumes the event, it
notifies the analyzer via the skip FSM() call. The analyzer will thus stop invoking any
additional FSM and will skip to the next event. This greatly improved the analyzer’s
performance. The slowdown percentages are shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.1 Fixing trace size to 500 MB, varying the number of dbench clients.
Figure 4.2 Fixing trace size to 500 MB, varying the number of dbench clients and skip-
ping unnecessary FSM invocations.
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this chapter we discuss some of the advantages our solution provides. Then, we
describe how flexible and scalable the approach is.
5.1 Current Limitations
As seen in Chapter 2, the available trace analysis tools do not provide a way to describe
patterns and validate their existence in a kernel trace. They do provide, however, high
level views of the trace enabling experts to visually identify erroneous behavior such
as the disactivation of interrupts for a relatively long period. They also provide domain
specific C-like languages that are used to implement the callback functions for every
registered event. These functions are typically used to print some warnings, log some
information or compute some statistics. They do not provide an easy way to describe
complex patterns that could be composed of multiple simple ones, nor do they support
managing multiple coexisting instances of the same pattern. For instance, the program-
mer would still have to manually encode the pattern in question across the different probe
handlers, using an imperative C-like language.
5.2 Proposed Solution
Our proposed solution has many advantages:
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5.2.1 High-level Pattern Description
The automata-based approach provides a high level of abstraction for patterns descrip-
tion, resulting in a more compact and simple pattern definition. This relieves the pro-
grammer from the burden of dealing with implementation details of the patterns, espe-
cially when multiple instances of the same pattern could coexist. FSMs are therefore
used not only for modeling the problem but also for execution. While the automata-
based approach offers great flexibility for describing patterns, the analyzer’s API pro-
vides very useful features such as FSM forking and destruction, or skipping unnecessary
FSM invokations whenever an event can be consumed by only one pattern instance.
5.2.2 Exhaustive Trace Analysis
The analysis framework we propose enables field experts to share their knowledge by
writing as many patterns as they want based on their experience, to form a pool of pat-
terns. By having a large pool of problematic patterns to be validated automatically and
simultaneously, we maximize our chances of finding one or more problems occurring on
traced production systems.
5.2.3 Offline/Online Analysis
Eventhough our main concern was more oriented towards offline trace analysis, our
solution could be easily ported to run online, on production systems. The impact greatly
depends on the pattern being validated and therefore one should carefully decide on the
nature of the patterns used for online validation.
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5.2.4 Maintenance
The proposed solution encourages the maintenance and optimization of pattern descrip-
tions to maximize the number of problems we would want to detect from a trace. Fur-
thermore, there are no maintenance costs for the State Machine Language which is an
open-source project, unlike the Domain Specific Languages we studied in Chapter 1.
5.2.5 Parallelization
The proposed solution can be easily parallelizable on multiple levels:
5.2.5.1 Multiple Instances
An important factor to consider is that two or more instances of the same pattern are
sensitive on the same events. Very often, no execution order is required when invoking
multiple FSMs of the same type. They can therefore be executed in parallel among
multiple processors.
5.2.5.2 Multiple Distinct Patterns
Distinct patterns targetting different problems, may also run in parallel. For instance, if
pattern A and pattern B require same events but for different kinds of analysis, paral-
lelization would result in a speedup. When A and B’s common events are encountered,
both patterns could be processed in parallel. However, if A and B don’t share any com-
mon events of interest, parallelization is less convenient; for a given event, either A or B
will be processed but not both.
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5.2.5.3 Sequential Ordering
The only case where parallelization is non convenient, occurs whenever a complex pat-
tern is composed of multiple simple ones and, therefore, an evaluation order is required.
There, the simple patterns should be evaluated first, generating synthetic events, which
are then be consumed by the higher level complex pattern.
5.3 Promising Results
We showed in chapters 4 and 5 that the analyzer exhibits a slowdown proportional to
the number of coexisting FSMs. However, this slowdown could be minimized in certain
cases, depending on the nature of the pattern in question. This was shown in section
4.2.1. Whenever one or very few coexisting instances of a pattern are required through-
out the analysis, the analyzer’s performance would scale up linearly with respect to the
trace size. Furthermore, the results shown in the previous chapter suggest a 20 microsec-
ond processing time per relevant event. Therefore, whenever the frequence of relevant
events occurring on a live system is less than 50kHz, non-fully-exploited CPUs under
production could very well be used for online pattern matching.
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CONCLUSION
In this work, a solution was proposed for pattern matching in large kernel traces. We
started by collecting a set of typical problems that could occur on production systems.
This enabled us to create a list of requirements for a pattern description language. Then,
we studied the different trace analysis tools. A large majority of these tools provide their
own domain specific languages which are not always adapted for pattern description. We
were able to group the languages used by these tools into three different categories: Do-
main Specific Languages, General Purpose Languages and Automata-based Languages.
We presented the pros and cons of each and every category. The automata-based lan-
guages fulfilled the pattern description requirements we came up with.
A number of patterns were actually implemented using the selected state-machine lan-
guage. They include:
• Locking Validation: This pattern validates a subset of the kernel locking rules.
The details are found in Chapter 4. This pattern enabled us to find a suspicious
code sequence in the Linux kernel which could generate a deadlock.
• Real-time constraints checking: This pattern verifies that the real-time con-
straints of a certain application were being respected throughout the trace. Metrics
such as the scheduling frequency as well as the allocated time slice are computed
by the FSM so that a warning is generated whenever an unexpected condition oc-
curs.
• Escaping the chroot jail: This pattern makes sure that no privileged process er-
roneously calls the chroot() system call without an immediate subsequent chdir()
call.
• Acessing a closed fd: This pattern checks that no process has ever accessed a
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closed file descriptor throughout the trace.
The analyzer’s performance depends greatly on the nature of the patterns being vali-
dated. For patterns that do not require multiple self-instances to be generated during
validation, the analysis time is almost equivalent to reading the trace which is directly
proportional to the trace size. However, for patterns that do require self-instances to be
generated, the analyzer exhibits a higher slowdown as the number of coexisting FSMs
increases. This is mainly due to the fact that the analyzer will have to iterate over all
the coexisting FSMs, invoking them one after the other for every relevant event. For
certain cases, where the event could be consumed by at most one FSM, we were able to
reduce the execution time of the analyzer by a considerable factor. We also compared the
performance of the automata-based approach with that of a dedicated approach for the
locking validation pattern. The dedicated approach is implemented in C and its internal
data structures are updated upon encountering relevant events without any FSM invoca-
tion. The dedicated approach was only 4.5% faster than the automata-based approach,
suggesting that the additional overhead of using finite state machines for execution, and
not just for modeling is acceptable especially in post-mortem analysis.
We argue that the solution we propose is highly parallelizable and may be very well
ported for online pattern matching. We also believe that the generated FSMs can be
easily maintained, expanded, or even be used to generate synthetic events to model more
complex scenarios.
Future Work Further explorations could be done to support handling synthetic events.
The main objective would be to allow the representation of high-level compound events,
composed of multiple primitive ones, so that they could be used to describe more com-
plex patterns efficiently and modularly.
One limitation in our implementation is the fact that the analyzer maps a given pattern
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to the list of the events it requires regardless of the FSM’s current state. For instance, a
relevant event for the pattern will trigger a function call, whether the event is required in
the FSM’s current state or not. This could be avoided if the analyzer knows beforehand
the list of states from which at least one transition is sensitive on that event of interest.
Ideally, the analyzer should only invoke the state machine when the event could trigger
a transition from its current state.
The solution we proposed is highly parallelizable and we would like to study the result-
ing speedup in an attempt to perform the analysis online.
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